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ABSTRACT
SKILL MISMATCH AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN THE
U.S.
SEPTEMBER 2009
FABIA´N SLONIMCZYK
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF BUENOS AIRES
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
This dissertation is an empirical investigation into the distributive effects of over-
and under-education, defined as market outcomes such that some workers possess
skills over or below those required at their jobs respectively. This type of market fail-
ure can arise in assignment and search equilibrium settings, as well as in the presence
of asymmetric information regarding workers’ performance on the job. The existence
of permanent and sizable mismatch rates means that returns to education are de-
pressed for over-educated workers and inflated for under-qualified workers. Thus,
irreversible decisions to invest in human capital are made in a context of uncertainty
regarding the exact outcomes that might arise. As in the Todaro model, where in-
dividuals decide whether to migrate to cities based on the expected values of the
available alternatives, workers might decide it is worthwhile to keep investing in edu-
cation even if the probability of finding appropriate employment is falling. The three
chapters of the dissertation are entitled: “Skill Mismatch and Earnings: A Panel anal-
ysis of the U.S. Labor Market,” “Earnings Inequality and Skill Mismatch in the U.S:
vi
1973–2003,” and “Employment and Distribution Effects of Changes in the Minimum
Wage.”
Skill Mismatch and Earnings: A Panel analysis of the U.S. Labor Mar-
ket
This chapter examines the effect on earnings induced by a mismatch between work-
ers’ skills and the skills actually required on the job. It uses the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the period 1983–2002. The special re-interview methodology of
the CPS is used to create a large panel, so that individual heterogeneity can be con-
trolled for. Skill requirements are estimated by the median education level for each
3-digit occupation in the 1980 census occupational classification. The analysis, in-
cluding the determination of skill requirements, is conducted for males and females
separately. Cross-sectional analysis confirms the findings in the recent literature.
Returns to required schooling are higher than the returns to attained education in
standard earnings regressions. Also, for workers with similar educational attainment,
over-education reduces earnings and under-education increases them. Contrary to
what other studies have found, we conclude that these results are confirmed after
controlling for individual fixed effects. The chapter also investigates which groups are
more exposed to mismatch. I use standard probit analysis with over-education and
under-education as the respective dependent variables. Women, service sector, and
non-unionized workers appear to have higher probabilities of mismatch.
Earnings Inequality and Skill Mismatch
This chapter shows that skill mismatch is a significant source of inequality in real
earnings in the U.S. and that a substantial fraction of the increase in wage dispersion
during the period 1973–2002 was due to the increase in mismatch rates and mismatch
premia. Standard human capital earnings regressions that do not decompose the
education variable into required, surplus, and deficit years provide biased estimates
of the relative importance of education in explaining earnings inequality. In 2000–2002
vii
surplus and deficit qualifications taken together accounted for 4.3 and 4.6 percent of
the variance in earnings, or around 15 percent of the total explained variance. The
dramatic increase in over-education rates and premia accounts for around 11 and
32 percent of the increase in the coefficient of variation of log earnings during the 30
years under analysis for males and females respectively. Residual inequality is slightly
diminished when the estimating equation allows the prices of surplus, required and
deficit qualifications to differ but the well-studied increasing trend of within-group
inequality remains otherwise unchanged. Changes in the composition of the labor
force are found to be important predictors of increasing residual inequality even when
skill mismatch is taken into account.
The Distributive Effects of the Minimum Wage: an Efficiency Wage
Model with Skill Mismatch (co-authored with Peter Skott)
This chapter analyzes the effect of changes in the real value of the minimum wage on
the wage distribution. Changes in the minimum wage and other labor market insti-
tutions affect workers in all groups and empirically appear to be good complement
to standard supply and demand arguments in explaining overall inequality. We use
an efficiency wage model but allow for mismatch between jobs and workers. This
framework yields predictions not only on the skill premium but also on the extent
of inequality within groups. To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that
high-skill workers can get two types of jobs (good and bad), whereas low-skill workers
have only one type of employment opportunity (bad). As long as some matches of
high-skill workers and bad jobs are sustained in equilibrium, changes in the exogenous
variables will affect not only wages and employment rates but also the degree of mis-
match. Thus, this paper shows that ‘over-education’ can be generated endogenously
in efficiency wage models and that a fall in the real value of the minimum wage can
(i) reduce total employment, (ii) lead to a simultaneous decline in both the relative
employment and the relative wage of low-skill workers, and (iii) produce a rise in
viii
within-group as well as between-group inequality. Evidence from the US suggests
that these theoretical results are empirically relevant.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable stylized facts about labor markets in developed
economies in the last half century is the trend toward the increase in the average
skill of workers. Every year an immense amount of resources are dedicated to in-
creasing those skills, what Gary Becker and others call investments in human capital.
In particular, an ever larger fraction of the American labor force has chosen to par-
ticipate in college education. This dissertation delves into the question of whether a
significant fraction of the resources invested in human capital formation might not be
fully utilized and what the consequences are thereof.
I refer to situations in which a significant fraction of employed workers possess
skills above or below those required at their jobs as over- and under-education, re-
spectively. Such market outcomes are not what one would expect in a system with
full price flexibility and perfect information and are probably undesirable in and by
themselves. Over-education in particular not only implies that resources have been
wasted in surplus qualifications but also that, in all probability, worker satisfaction
is low. Investments in human capital surely have a pecuniary aspect. Underemploy-
ment of skills is bad in this sense because surplus qualifications are remunerated very
poorly at best. Perhaps in a more fundamental sense over-education is undesirable
because it implies many people’s expectations and aspirations are being disappointed.
In surveys of job quality, workers usually rank nonpecuniary aspects such as auton-
omy on the job, time self-management, and appropriate career prospects higher than
1
monetary rewards.1 Thus, earnings differentials between correctly matched and mis-
matched workers with the same level of acquired skill might underestimate the true
cost of over-education.
While the increasing supply of skills brought to the market by workers is an undis-
puted fact, there has been a long-running debate in labor economics and sociology
regarding the effect of capitalist development on the skill content of jobs. One view
sees technological progress as mostly driven by employers’ aim to better control the
production process in order to increase their share in the distribution of income. For
example, Marglin (1974) argued that neither the minute division of labor of the old
putting-out system nor the centralized organization of the factory system were intro-
duced primarily due to their technical superiority. These innovations were meant to
change the strategic balance of power between capitalists and workers in favor of the
former. The deskilling hypothesis of Braverman (1974) further argues that technolog-
ical change under capitalism is incessantly directed at reducing the skills of the labor
force. Craftsmen and artisans are replaced by assembly line workers. Deskilled labor
is not only cheaper but also easier to control since workers lack direct engagement in
the production process.
The opposing view holds that there is substantial technology-skill complementar-
ity. For example, Goldin and Katz (1998) show that in the early twentieth century
leading industries—those that invested more heavily in capital and used electric en-
ergy more intensely—would subsequently employ relatively more educated blue-collar
workers. Technological progress does not destroy skills but on the contrary enables
the creation of new positions for managers and engineers. In fact, one of the leading
explanations for the increasing inequality between skill groups in the last few decades
1See Siebern-Thomas (2005) for example.
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is that technological change has been biased toward high-skill workers (Acemoglu,
2002).
The debate over the effect of technological change on skill inspired a large number
of empirical studies. In an often-cited review, Spenner (1983) argued these investiga-
tions constituted a third position—the “mixed effects or little-net-change hypothesis”.
According to this position there are offsetting effects of technology on skill require-
ments, mostly depending on the level of automation of the new processes and the
specific characteristics of the organizations orchestrating the change. Also, it is nec-
essary to study the effect of technical change both on job content and the distribution
of jobs. The former effect has probably moved the economy in the direction of skill
upgrading but the job distribution seems to have favored low and middle skill workers
in the service sector. Recent studies all document moderate increases in skill require-
ments in the US (Howell and Wolff, 1991; Cappelli, 1993; Osterman, 1995). However,
in light of the remarkable increases in average education attainment it is clear that
the economy as a whole is not creating high-skill jobs at a fast enough pace.
“Skill” is a fuzzy concept that refers to multiple capacities and abilities that
workers acquire through education and training. The debate has led researchers to
emphasize some aspects of skill and ignore others. According to Spenner (1983),
two key dimensions of skill are “substantive complexity” and “autonomy control”.
The two dimensions appear to be empirically correlated. However, while skill as
substantive complexity has been emphasized in the literature on skill upgrading,
autonomy control is the preferred focus of the deskilling tradition. Finally, pragmatic
considerations—data availability in particular—have also played an important role in
determining a metric for skill requirements.
In the essays that follow I use two different measures of skills required on the job.
In chapter two I use a statistical measure involving the median education attainment
for each sex-occupation group. This measure has the advantage of being widely
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available and should be a good proxy of true requirements as long as the occupational
classification groups together jobs with similar characteristics. The main problem
with a statistical measure is that it is sensitive to cohort effects. The large increases
in average schooling tends to push every occupation’s skill distribution to the right,
so that skill requirements are artificially increased. Indeed the reason we use median
education and not the arithmetic mean is that the former is less susceptible to this
kind of spurious movement. The cohort effects are not neutral either, in the sense that
some occupations have received an increasing proportion of new entrants. Therefore
this measure cannot be used to study the evolution of mismatch in time. Because
the essays in chapters three and four deal with dynamics, I use a measure based on
professional assessment of skill requirements that is not sensitive to cohort effects. In
this case the drawback is that data are only available for 1977 and 1991.
As mentioned above, skill mismatch can reasonably be thought to be a bad thing
in and by itself. Chapter two shows that it is also bad for workers earnings. The
approach in this chapter is an extension of the now traditional Mincerian wage equa-
tion. Following Duncan and Hoffman (1981), I decompose workers’ schooling into
required, surplus, and deficit years and estimate an earnings equation that also in-
cludes all the standard controls. The data comes from the yearly earnings extracts
of the Current Population Survey for the period 1983–2002. I treat the data as a
repeated cross section and estimate the equation for each year separately. As in the
rest of the now extensive empirical literature on skill mismatch, I find that the re-
turns to surplus and deficit qualifications are very small in absolute value whereas the
returns to qualifications that are actually required on the job are much higher than
the conventional 6% obtained in standard studies of the returns to human capital
investments. Note that the standard Mincerian approach is a restricted version of
Duncan and Hoffman’s. Simple tests of linear restrictions can be applied to deter-
mine whether the unrestricted version has statistical support, which is what I find in
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every case. Thus, according to these estimates not every investor in human capital
gets the same return. Workers who are employed at a job whose requirements match
their acquired skills receive a substantial premium relative to over-educated workers
with the same level of education. The chapter also includes a probit analysis of the
determinants of mismatch. Belonging to a minority group or working for the service
sector increases the probability of over-education.
The main objection that can be raised against estimating an unrestricted earn-
ings equation involves the risk of mismeasurement caused by unobservable ability.
Low-ability workers, for example, might be incorrectly classified as over-educated
because—all else equal—they possess lower skill levels than high-ability workers. Note
that this argument, if correct, rebuts the Duncan and Hoffman specification but also
that of Mincer. The right specification should contain required qualifications only,
assuming these are correctly measured. One way to address this objection is to esti-
mate a panel version of the unrestricted equation and include individual fixed effects.
Because an individual’s ability level does not vary from one year to the next, the
within estimator is implicitly controlling for the ability mismeasurement problem.
The main contribution of this part of the dissertation is the result that controlling
for fixed effects does not eliminate the statistically significant difference between the
returns to required and non-required qualifications.
The second contribution of the dissertation appears in the third chapter. As Cap-
pelli (1993, p.515) puts it: “whether the demand for skills is changing is a vitally
important question for public policy, because such a change affects the distribution
of income, the extent of technological unemployment, and whether there are short-
ages of some skills that may lead to a lack of competitiveness, especially relative
to economies in which a higher proportion of the labor force possesses those skills.”
Strangely, despite the burgeoning interest on the increasing earnings inequality in
the US, no specialized study of the impact of skill mismatch on wage inequality had
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been written so far. Researchers focused attention on what fraction of the increase in
inequality corresponded to a widening gap between skill groups and what fraction to
within-group inequality. Inequality between groups is easy to rationalize in terms of
a simple supply and demand model without unemployment or skill mismatch. The
fact that within-group or residual inequality is so important empirically could be
seen as somewhat puzzling but could nevertheless be explained by an increase in the
unobservable returns to unobservable ability. My alternative hypothesis is that the
increase in skill mismatch is responsible for a significant percentage of the increase
in inequality. Using a Shorrocks-type decomposition, in this chapter I show that the
dramatic increase in over-education rates and premia over the period 1973–2002 ac-
counts for around 11 and 32 percent of the increase in the coefficient of variation of
log earnings for males and females respectively.
Also dedicated to the consequences of skill mismatch, the fourth chapter is dif-
ferent than the rest of the dissertation in two important and related ways. First,
it was written in collaboration with my adviser, Peter Skott. Second, the chapter
includes a formal mathematical model. Skill mismatch equilibria have been studied
in the context of assignment and search theory models (Sattinger, 2006; Albrecht and
Vroman, 2002). Skott (2006) shows that in an efficiency wage framework with skill
and job heterogeneity there will also generally be an endogenously determined rate
of over-education. The dissertation chapter extends this model to an analysis of the
effect of changes in the real value of the minimum wage on employment and the wage
distribution. The model is very simple and allows for only two types of job — high
and low-tech — and two types of worker — high and low-skill. Furthermore, the
model assumes that only high-skill workers can take high-tech positions so the feasi-
ble matches are reduced to three possibilities. We show that the binding minimum
wage creates an indeterminacy in the model and analyze the results of introducing
alternative closures. In what probably is the empirically more relevant case, firms
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have a preference for low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. Under these conditions, an
increase in the minimum wage has positive employment effects for both worker types
(i.e. there are monopsonistic effects). Numerical simulations also show that a falling
real value of the minimum wage can lead to increasing between- and within-group
inequality. Thus, the model provides an alternative explanation for the increase in
inequality in the last few decades without relying on skill biased technological change.
Based on insights gained from the model, the fourth chapter includes a number of
empirical applications. First, we provide the first estimates of the economy-wide elas-
ticity of substitution between high- and low-tech jobs. Previous studies have focused
attention on the degree of substitutability of high and low-skill workers (Autor et al.,
2008). However, our model suggests that the appropriate inputs to the production
function are jobs and not people. According to our analysis, high-tech jobs are sig-
nificantly less substitutable by low-tech jobs than college workers are by high-school
workers. In other words, it takes a larger proportional change in the high-tech pre-
mium to affect the job composition than it takes the college premium to affect the skill
composition of the employed labor force. This result is consistent with the existence
of substantial skill mismatch. Second, the model also implies that the job composition
is endogenously determined. We therefore estimate reduced form equations of both
the relative wage and relative employment. The estimates from this section confirm a
lower elasticity of substitution between jobs than between skill types. Also, we show
that the minimum wage has a negative effect on wage inequality and no significant
effect on unemployment, as the model predicts.
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CHAPTER 2
SKILL MISMATCH AND EARNINGS: A PANEL
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. LABOR MARKET
2.1 Introduction
The fraction of those employed in the U.S. labor force holding a college degree
increased substantially during the period 1983–2002 (See table 2.1). Even more re-
markable was the increase in the prevalence of those with post-graduate degrees. The
spreading out of higher education to a wider spectrum of the population is not a re-
cent phenomenon but a long run trend. In 1964, the share of all Americans who were
high school dropouts was as high as 47% and the proportion of young (age 24–29)
people with less than a high school diploma was 31% (Handel, 2003).
The very rapid improvement in average educational attainment naturally leads
to the question whether the economy can successfully absorb the growing supply of
graduates1.
In the human capital model of the labor market workers allocate time and re-
sources to education to maximize expected lifetime utility. Profit-maximizing firms,
in turn, are willing to fully utilize the skills of their workforce—and reward workers
according to their marginal product—by adopting appropriate production techniques
1This concern can be traced back to the 1970s. Credentialist theories within sociology argued
that corporation’s inflating hiring requirements induced over-investment in education (Berg, 1971).
In economics, the signalling model also cast a skeptical eye toward the value of educational creden-
tials (Spence, 1973). Freeman (1976) provided convincing evidence showing that Americans were
increasingly overeducated, leading to a declining wage premium for college graduates. This was
consistent with the view that the educational system’s main objective consists in the socialization of
students into work norms without truly increasing potential productivity (Bowles and Gintis, 1975,
1976, 2002).
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Table 2.1. Education Attainment of the Employed Labor Force: 1979-2002
Year Education level
LTHS HS Some College College Advanced
1979 23.0% 36.4% 21.8% 13.0% 5.8%
1980 21.6% 36.6% 22.3% 13.4% 6.1%
1981 20.7% 36.9% 22.6% 13.5% 6.3%
1982 19.3% 37.0% 23.1% 14.2% 6.5%
1983 18.2% 36.8% 23.6% 14.6% 6.8%
1984 16.2% 38.7% 22.3% 15.5% 7.3%
1985 15.4% 38.6% 22.7% 15.9% 7.5%
1986 14.7% 38.8% 23.0% 16.1% 7.4%
1987 14.4% 38.2% 23.3% 16.4% 7.6%
1988 14.1% 38.1% 23.4% 16.4% 8.0%
1989 14.1% 38.5% 23.6% 15.9% 7.9%
1990 13.7% 37.9% 24.0% 16.4% 8.1%
1991 13.0% 37.6% 24.4% 16.8% 8.2%
1992 10.8% 38.0% 26.1% 16.8% 8.2%
1993 10.3% 37.2% 27.0% 17.2% 8.3%
1994 9.9% 35.9% 28.0% 17.7% 8.5%
1995 9.7% 34.5% 28.2% 18.4% 9.1%
1996 9.5% 33.5% 28.1% 19.4% 9.5%
1997 9.5% 33.6% 27.6% 19.7% 9.5%
1998 9.4% 32.9% 27.7% 20.1% 9.9%
1999 9.0% 32.1% 27.8% 20.7% 10.5%
2000 9.1% 31.4% 27.9% 21.0% 10.6%
2001 8.6% 31.1% 28.0% 21.3% 11.0%
2002 8.1% 31.0% 27.8% 21.9% 11.2%
Source: Author’s Calculations. CPS-ORG.
(Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1971). The existence of skill mismatch, individuals having
acquired skills significantly different from those required by their job, appears to be
ruled out as a possible outcome of the expansion in qualifications during the last few
decades2.
Workers with at least some college education have a consistently lower probability
of being unemployed (figure 2.1). The gap between the unemployment series for high
and low-skill workers shows a decreasing tendency during the period, both for males
and for females, but have remained fairly constant. In and by itself lower unemploy-
ment probabilities, however, do not have any straightforward implications for workers’
ability to find jobs where their skill levels are fully utilized. Moreover, after the al-
ready mentioned fall during the 1970s, the relative earnings of college graduates—the
“college premium”—increased together with the increased supply (Levy and Mur-
2However, some degree of mismatch is not completely inconsistent with the neoclassical model. It
is entirely possible that some workers are under- or over-educated in the short run, while firms adjust
their production processes. Also, the mismatch can be rationalized within the model if workers with
the same qualifications have differing unobservable “informal” human capital or job experience (or
if they are heterogenous in innate ability).
9
nane, 1992). This last fact has led many researcher to believe that the demand for
college graduates not only kept pace with supply but exceeded it, leading to a hike
in the price. Others have remained more skeptical, pointing to the fact that college
graduates seem to increasingly be taking jobs that do not normally require the skills
acquired through college and that much of the increase in the college premium is
due to the constant fall of the real wage for those with high school education only
(Hecker, 1992; Shelly, 1992). In other words, while there exists strong evidence that
more education does tend to improve the welfare of those who invest in human cap-
ital (Mincer, 1974; Psacharopoulos, 1981; Lemieux, 2006b), the evidence also seems
to indicate that not every ‘investor’ gets the same return.
In the recent literature on skill mismatch, every job in the economy is characterized
not only by the wage it pays but also by the qualifications it requires (Green et al.,
1999; Hartog, 2000; Sloane, 2003; McGuinness, 2006). Workers filling a position are
considered correctly matched if their attained education level is equal to the level
required by the job. It is also possible for a worker to be mismatched, i.e. placed in
a job in which she is under- or over-educated3. Mismatched workers have surplus or
deficit qualifications for the job.
There is considerable variation in the estimated incidence of skill mismatch. De-
pending on the measure utilized, the country, the period, and data source, studies
have found rates of over-education ranging from 10 to 42%, with an “un-weighted”
average of 23.3% in the 25 studies summarized by Groot and Maassen van den Brink
(2000). Their average for under-education is 14.4%4.
Here we extend the existing literature by analyzing a consistent time series of over-
and under-education for the U.S. for the period 1983–2002. We focus on the effect
3Other terms in the literature are over-qualified, over-schooled, over-trained, under-employed,
under-utilized, etc.
4The standard deviations for these averages are quite high: 9.9 and 8.2 percentage points re-
spectively.
10
of match status on earnings. If the human capital model is correct, the returns to
required qualifications should not be statistically different from the returns to surplus
and deficit qualifications. As we show below, the cross sectional evidence points in a
different direction. Skill mismatch imposes substantial penalties on workers’ earnings,
confirming the findings in most other studies in the literature.
One possible problem with cross-sectional estimates, however, is that surplus and
deficit qualifications might be the result of unobserved abilities. Lower ability indi-
viduals, for example, might take longer to obtain a given level of skill. Under this
scenario it is not surprising to find that the “returns” to surplus qualifications are
low. In order to address this issue we estimate the same model for a panel of indi-
viduals, which allows controlling for fixed effects. Since ability does not vary within
individuals, these estimates do not suffer from the same problem as the cross sectional
ones.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section briefly reviews the existing method-
ologies for measuring skill mismatch and explains the benefits and possible problems
with the statistical method used here. In contrast to previous applications, the es-
timation of skill requirements is conducted separately for females and males. The
third section analyzes the distribution of skill requirements across occupations. It
also presents an elementary time series analysis of the over-education series, and an
analysis of mismatched rates for some relevant sub-populations. The fourth section
estimates Duncan and Hoffman’s ORU equation using yearly cross sections. Sec-
tion five presents the panel analysis. The final section summarizes the results and
concludes.
2.2 Measurement issues
There is consensus regarding the difficulty of measuring educational requirements.
Researchers have used three main approaches, all of which have advantages and draw-
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backs. First, the subjective or worker self-assessment method utilizes information
given by workers themselves, typically the answer to a question such as “(w)hat was
the minimum formal qualification required for (entering) this job?” (Dolton and Vi-
gnoles, 2000, p. 182, cited in Chevalier, 2003). The advantage of this approach is the
relative specificity of the information regarding the particular job. All other method-
ologies assign the same educational requirement to all jobs within a pre-determined
group or category. However, the measure probably leads to biases arising from re-
spondents’ confusion among the qualifications required for entering, keeping, and
performing the job. Workers might also inflate their answers as a form of self-praise
or simply regurgitate whatever the standard requirement is supposed to be according
to custom. At the most basic level workers’ assessment of the qualifications required
at their jobs are based on a limited (and probably rather small) number of individual
experiences regarding educational levels and jobs.
The job-analysis or “objective” measure relies on systematic evaluation by pro-
fessional job analysts who specify the required level of skills for the job titles in an
occupational classification. The best example of such analysis is the United States
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT: U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, 1991). A
problem with the DOT is that it provides a variety of alternative measures of job-skill
requirements. Cognitive, interactive and motor skill indices are linked to consistent
employment matrices (267 occupations and 64 industries). The most often used mea-
sure of workplace skills is called “General Educational Development” (GED). On a
scale of one to six, GED measures mathematical, language and reasoning skills for
each job title5.
The DOT has clear definitions and detailed measurement instructions that all
analysts are supposed to follow. Unfortunately, carrying out such detailed analysis is
5A good analysis of the trends in the GED and other DOT measures of required skills can be
found in Wolff (2000).
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very expensive, so the DOT is published only at very wide time intervals. Moreover,
later editions mostly repeat the description and analysis of occupations already con-
tained in previous editions, the new research mostly focusing on new categories6. An
implication is that longitudinal studies require strong assumptions about the behavior
of the measures between the years for which there is data. For example, Vaisey (2006)
uses a database compiled by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) to allocate a GED
score to each occupation in the 3-digit 1970 and 1980 occupational classification for
the years 1971 and 1991. He is then forced to apply a linear interpolation to allocate
a GED value to occupations in other years. A final problem involves translating the
GED score into a “years of education required for the job” measure, which usually
requires some extra assumptions. For example, Vaisey uses a regression imputation
approach using a separate dataset that contains both the 3-digit occupational codes
and self-reported (subjective) education requirements.
As the discussion so far indicates, it is very difficult to accurately identify those
jobs that require college degree or some other level of skills. First, standards dif-
fer among workers, employers, and experts. Second, whatever standards prevail at
one point in time are subject to change due to technological improvements and cap-
ital accumulation. The third and final measure of skill mismatch uses a statistical
approach to try to overcome these problems. It involves looking at the actual dis-
tribution of education for a given occupation and establishing cutoff points beyond
which an individual is designated as under- or over-educated. In most studies (Clogg
and Shockey, 1984; Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989; Groot, 1993; Cohn and Khan, 1995;
Bauer, 2002) the cutoff is one standard deviation below and above the mean, although
other measures of central tendency (the median) can be used to attenuate the influ-
ence of extreme values. This measure of mismatch is always available and consistent
6Spenner (1985) reviews the quality of this type of skill requirement assessment.
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for all occupations. It has been criticized because of the arbitrary nature of the one-
standard-deviation criterion and because it might be subject to cohort effects when
large numbers of workers with the same education level move into an occupation.
Studies that compare the three approaches to measuring mismatch find low cor-
relation among them. Also, the worker self-assessment strategy seems to result in
higher estimates of the incidence of over-education (See for example, McGuinness,
2006). In this study we use a statistical approach to measure the incidence of skill
mismatch.
2.2.1 The Data
We use the NBER extract of the CPS earnings files (merged outgoing rotation
groups) for the years 1983–20027. For the estimation of skill requirements and the
calculation of the rates of mismatch, we restrict the sample to employed wage and
salary workers who were not students at the time of interview. Other than these
restrictions, every individual 16 years of age or older is included. Table 2.2 shows the
cumulative effects of these restrictions on sample size.
Because non-response rates are high for the earnings module, the BLS allocates
earnings to non-respondents by means of a hot-deck imputation method. While the
system arguably increases efficiency for some calculations, it has been shown to pro-
duce significant biases in estimates of earnings equations. Also, because the hot-deck
involves duplicating the frequency of donors’ earnings, it systematically reduces esti-
mates of overall inequality. Thus, for calculations that involve earnings, we exclude
observations with allocated earnings whenever the corresponding allocation flag is
available. To correct for possible non-random selection into non-response, the sample
weight is adjusted by using a probit estimate of the probability of response. The
7Details on many issues discussed in this subsection are available in a separate data appendix.
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Table 2.2. Sample Restrictions
Year CPS-ORG Full
Sample Size
Employed (%) Non-student (%) Wage & Salary
(%)
Earnings not
allocated (%)
1983 348,521 57.88 57.87 50.84 43.29
1984 343,665 59.53 56.36 49.29 41.45
1985 343,591 60.13 57.19 50.25 42.69
1986 338,051 60.69 57.73 50.80 45.00
1987 337,000 61.52 58.31 51.32 43.85
1988 320,821 62.27 58.88 51.73 43.63
1989 322,883 62.95 59.59 52.29 50.64
1990 339,342 62.80 59.46 52.30 50.56
1991 335,832 61.66 58.48 51.32 49.53
1992 330,588 61.46 58.33 51.17 49.59
1993 326,517 61.72 58.30 51.10 49.46
1994 317,743 62.53 58.60 51.35 50.64
1995 312,973 62.90 59.10 51.97 47.40
1996 276,749 63.17 59.50 52.42 39.73
1997 279,569 63.78 59.94 52.84 39.82
1998 279,221 64.06 60.43 53.50 39.63
1999 281,677 64.25 60.57 53.86 37.87
2000 282,249 64.40 60.97 54.20 36.94
2001 301,952 63.66 60.62 53.93 35.94
2002 328,675 62.73 59.79 53.24 35.42
Note: Restrictions applied sequentially from left to right. The columns give the fraction of the full sample
remaining after the corresponding restriction is applied.
earnings weight is also adjusted by multiplying by usual weekly hours, so as to make
the sample of hourly earnings representative of the total hours worked in the economy.
The earnings variable we use is constructed to represent real hourly earnings in-
cluding overtime, tips and commissions. The standard Pareto distribution adjustment
is applied to correct for topcoding. No exclusions of observations were made due to
implausible or “extreme” wage values. Hourly earnings are weekly earnings including
overtime, tips and commissions divided by usual weekly hours, except in the case
when a separate (and higher) hourly rate is provided. Earnings are deflated using the
CPI-U-X1 series.
Our period of analysis is 1983–2002, i.e. the period during which the 1980 Census
occupational classification was used in the CPS. Minor changes in the 3-digit classifi-
cation were introduced in 1991, so we adjust the occupation variable in the years prior
to the change to retain continuity. The other important variable used in this study
is educational attainment. We follow the imputation procedure developed by Jaeger
(1997a, 2003) to obtain a consistent measure of the highest grade completed8. Tables
2.3 and 2.4 contain descriptive statistics for the most important variables used.
8The exception is for individuals with at least some college in the years 1992-7. Details in the
appendix.
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Figure 2.1. Unemployment
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2.3 Skill Requirements
Surveys asking workers what level of education is required at their current jobs
indicate that most jobs in retail sales; administrative support (including clerical);
service; farm; precision production, craft, and repair; and operator, fabricator, and
laborer occupational groups do not require a college degree for entry, nor do they
offer job duties attractive to most college graduates. In contrast, jobs in managerial,
professional, and/or technical occupations require a degree, in the sense that the
skills generally learnt in college are necessary in order to successfully accomplish
most tasks involved by the job. Thus, a first approach to measuring the proportion
of college graduates and post-graduates whose skills are underutilized at their jobs
involves focusing on skilled workers that are employed in occupations within retail
sales and the other major occupational groups identified as most often containing
non-college jobs. This strategy, originally developed in Hecker (1992), can be seen as
a preliminary version of the statistical approach utilized here.
The statistical method relies on the 3-digit occupational classification of the 1980
census. The classification comprises 501 occupations. Figure 2.2 exemplifies the
methodology for the case of female apparel sales workers (coded 264). Workers’
education attainment in this occupation if clearly concentrated around the median
of 12 years of formal schooling. The imputed years of schooling variable takes only
discrete values. The points in the scatter plot have been added some jitter, so that
the relative frequency of each value is represented by the density of the cloud of
points around the true value9. For each year we also create a one standard deviation
interval below and above the median. The resulting cutoffs are smoothed using a
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Workers whose formal schooling is above or below the cutoffs
are considered mismatched .
9Thus, the cloud of points around the cutoff lines represent workers who are not considered
mismatched.
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Figure 2.2. Example of Skill Requirement Estimation
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present statistics for skill requirements and mismatch rates
aggregated at the 2-digit occupational classification. Skill requirements range from
less than high-school equivalent in farming, forestry and fishing occupations to 18
years (the topcode) in occupations that require attending graduate schools like law
and medicine. During the 20 year period requirements increased by around half a year
on average, both for males and females. The increase should be compared to the 0.64
and 0.89 year increase in workers’ education attainment, again for males and females
respectively. As the education distribution moved to the right, median education
in many occupations has increased shifting the estimate for required qualifications.
Note also that the range within which an individual is classified as correctly matched
is normally quite large: 4 years of schooling or more in almost all cases.
20
For males, the occupational groups with highest rates of over-education (education
beyond the upper cutoff) are computer equipment operators, salesmen, and protective
service employees. In all these cases the over-education rates range between 20 and
25%. Women suffer from markedly higher rates, with secretaries and financial records
processing occupations rising above 30%. Overall, over-education is clearly more
prevalent among women than men. With few exceptions, under-educated workers are
high-school dropouts. Because the dropout category is more common among males,
this type of mismatch also is. The occupations in which it is most prevalent include
technicians and managers. For females, however, under-education is more common
in the sciences and in some health treatment occupations.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the evolution of skill mismatch during the period. For
the entire employed labor force, over-education rates increased slightly for males and
remained fairly constant for females. Over-education fell markedly for high-skill work-
ers, mostly because of the increasing rates of participation in college and graduate
programs. As discussed above, the incorporation to the labor force of cohorts of highly
educated workers may inflate the estimate of required qualifications. As a result, the
cutoff points that determine who is classified as mismatched have shifted upwards.
Thus, the statistical measure of skill requirements does not produce reliable estimates
of the evolution in time of over- and under-education rates. In this study we focus
on inference at the cross section level. The exception is the panel study, which links
individuals in two consecutive survey years. Because the panel is very short, cohort
effects do not significantly affect the results.
The over-education series display a slight hump in the early 90s, more or less in
synchrony with the higher unemployment rates of the previous years. The visual
impression is not confirmed by further analysis, however. A regression of the over-
education rate on a time trend and two lags of the unemployment rates for high- and
low-skill workers does not render any significant coefficient for males or females.
The risk of mismatch is not evenly distributed. According to table 2.7, over-
education is particularly important for workers 25–34 years old. One possible inter-
pretation is that mismatch of this kind is chosen rationally as a career path. Also white
workers have higher risk of being over-educated and lower risk of under-education.
It might seem like over-education is not a problem related to minority status. The
simple descriptives also indicate higher over-education in the service sector and higher
under-education in manufacturing. Finally, participation in a union contract reduces
both forms of skill mismatch. These results are nonetheless affected by the different
levels of education attainment within the sub-populations. In table 2.8 we present
results from probit analysis conducted for the degrees of mismatch. Once education
24
Figure 2.3. The Incidence of Over-education
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Figure 2.4. The Incidence of Under-education
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Table 2.7. Mismatch Rates for Sub-populations
Subpopulation Overeduc Rate (%) Undereduc Rate (%)
Male Female Male Female
16–24 years old 6.0 15.1 13.4 10.5
25–34 years old 13.2 20.9 12.8 9.6
35–54 years old 13.8 16.5 15.7 12.5
55 and older 10.5 12.6 24.8 17.8
White 12.7 17.4 13.4 10.6
Non-white 10.5 16.1 22.6 16.8
Manufacturing 11.2 12.2 16.0 14.4
Services 12.7 17.9 15.2 11.7
Union 11.8 13.9 12.2 11.7
Non-union 12.3 17.6 16.6 12.2
Note: Source CPS-ORG.
and other controls are introduced, the effect of age on the probability of mismatch
is almost negligible. The marginal effect of minority status is actually positive for
over-education and negative for under-education, as one might have expected. Unions
decrease over-education among females and under-education for males, but the effects
are reverted for the other cases. The stylized fact is that higher education attainment
increases the likelihood of over-education and reduces under-education, and that dif-
ferences in the degree of mismatch for different groups depend on differences in how
educated their members are.
2.4 Mismatch and Earnings
Skill mismatch has been found to affect workers’ earnings. In one interpreta-
tion, labor productivity is determined by the characteristics of the job including skill
requirements and not by workers’ characteristics (Thurow, 1975). Employers may
give preference to workers with higher educational attainment because this and other
characteristics are taken to signal low training costs. Once hired, workers are taught
the skills actually required on the job. On one hand, jobs requiring more skills will
tend to pay higher wages because labor productivity is higher at those jobs (see Be-
wley, 1999, for an argument to the contrary). Workers have an incentive to invest
in acquiring skills in order to get the higher earnings. On the other hand, if workers
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Table 2.8. Probit Analysis of Skill Mismatch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mg. Effects Overed Females Overed Males Undered
Females
Undered Males
Non-white 0.009*** 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Manufacturing -0.008*** -0.001*** 0.005* 0.051***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.002]
Services -0.013*** -0.003*** 0.030*** 0.059***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
Age 25-34 -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.033*** 0.056***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Age 35-54 -0.005*** 0.000 0.046*** 0.086***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Age 55- -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.057*** 0.146***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Union -0.019*** 0.002*** 0.021*** -0.047***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Metro 0.005*** -0.000*** 0.003*** 0.017***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Married -0.005*** -0.001*** 0.013*** 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
High School Grad 0.019*** 0.147*** -0.215*** -0.199***
[0.005] [0.016] [0.001] [0.001]
Some College 0.641*** 0.944*** -0.164*** -0.168***
[0.017] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
College Grad 0.862*** 0.994*** -0.140*** -0.179***
[0.011] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Advanced Degree 0.913*** 0.999*** -0.116*** -0.154***
[0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1502856 1614665 1502964 1614680
Note: For dummy variables dF/dx is discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors in brackets. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regional and year dummies not reported.
are able to get the same job with less prior formal schooling, then the return to their
human capital will appear to be higher. Conversely, surplus education should not
receive compensation of any sort.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 provide evidence in favor of the first point. Male occupations
that require only a high-school degree such as construction laborers tend to pay
lower hourly earnings than engineering and science related occupations. Similarly, the
remarkable transition of women out of secretarial and clerical jobs and into managerial
occupations has resulted in higher earnings. Regarding the second point, workers
with surplus (deficit) education earn slightly more (less) than those that are correctly
matched. In other words, the returns to non-required years appear not to be zero.
This raises the question whether our distinction between required and non-required
years is relevant.
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2.4.1 The ORU approach
The now standard approach to test whether non-required years of schooling have
different returns involves estimating a modified Mincerian earnings equation10:
lnWi = Xi · γ +
[
Qri Q
s
i Q
u
i
]
·

β1
β2
β3
+ i (2.1)
Wi represents an individual’s earnings, which are assumed to have a log-normal
distribution (i is the random part) conditional on a vector of personal characteristics
Xi (including a constant) and qualifications Qi. The vectors of parameters to be
estimated are γ and β. The qualifications variable has three components: required
(r), surplus (s), and deficit (u) qualifications11 Each of these qualifications variables
are measured in years of formal education.
We first estimate equation 2.1 treating each year of data as a separate cross section.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 present the estimates for the returns to required, deficit, and
surplus schooling for males and females respectively. For comparison purposes we
include estimates from a traditional Mincerian equation, where the qualifications
variable is not decomposed. Returns to education increased during the 80s and then
fell toward the end of the decade, recovering only slowly during the 90s. The pattern is
very similar when the education variable is decomposed. The striking result, however,
is how much higher the returns are for required years of education with respect to
surplus or (the absolute value of) deficit years. In fact, the usual Mincerian returns
can be seen as a weighted average between required, surplus and deficit years. The
usual approach would lead us to conclude that an extra year of education increases
10This approach was first developed in Duncan and Hoffman (1981).
11The standard Mincerian approach would correspond to the particular case where β1 = β2 = β3,
so that required, surplus, and deficit education all receive the same return. The other particular
case of note corresponds to Thurow’s (1975) job competition model, where β2 = β3 = 0.
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earnings by around 7 or 8 percent for males and females respectively. The Duncan-
Hoffman approach, however, would make such judgement conditional on whether the
extra year is required on the job or not. If the extra year is required, the increase in
earnings will be between 10 and 12 percent. For surplus years, however, the return is
only 4 or 6 percent, again for males and females respectively. Similarly, adding one
year of education has low returns for under-educated workers.
Figure 2.5.
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Returns to Education: standard vs ORU approach
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Tables 2.11 through 2.14 have detailed regression results for the Duncan-Hoffman
equation. The controls include a quartic on age, minority status, part-time status, an
indicator for married individuals, union contract, as well as geographic, manufacturing
and services dummies. Tables 2.15 and 2.16, in turn, explore the evolution of returns
for different sub-populations. Estimates of equation 2.1 confirm the usual finding
regarding the concave form of the age-earnings profile. The impact of education on
earnings is felt more strongly among workers age 35 and older, especially for males.
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Figure 2.6.
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Regression results include the usual negative estimate for the non-white dummy.
Non-whites also have higher estimates for the traditional returns to attained education
in the sub-group regressions. The result disappears, however, when the education
variable is decomposed. Returns to required education are lower for non-whites
(the exception are the 1992 estimates for males, which are practically identical for
both groups). The under-education discount for non-whites is around 5 percent for
males and between 5 and 7 percent for females. Considering the high rates of under-
education among minority workers, further investments in human capital would pay
off even if mismatch remained at the same levels.
During the period 1983–2002 the shift of employment from manufacturing to ser-
vices has deepened (see again tables 2.3 and 2.4). For male workers the returns to
education are higher in manufacturing, especially for correctly matched workers. In
the case of women, manufacturing has higher returns only in the Duncan-Hoffman
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Table 2.11. ORU Equation Estimation for Males: 1983–1992
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Age 0.083 0.043 0.084 0.088 0.046 0.041 0.092 0.071 0.048 0.051
[0.015]** [0.019]* [0.014]** [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.012]**
Age2/100 -0.129 -0.009 -0.151 -0.163 -0.011 -0.008 -0.187 -0.116 -0.028 -0.036
[0.057]* [0.073] [0.055]** [0.046]** [0.057] [0.052] [0.057]** [0.042]** [0.051] [0.046]
Age3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Deficit
Qualif
-0.044 -0.047 -0.043 -0.048 -0.046 -0.044 -0.038 -0.041 -0.042 -0.038
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Required
Qualif
0.086 0.092 0.096 0.102 0.108 0.112 0.098 0.102 0.104 0.104
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Surplus
Qualif
0.039 0.044 0.048 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.041 0.045 0.043 0.042
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Nonwhite -0.165 -0.177 -0.191 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.158 -0.158 -0.16 -0.161
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
PT, eco-
nomic rea-
sons
-0.128 -0.186 -0.178 -0.198 -0.203 -0.173 -0.176 -0.175 -0.156 -0.184
[0.009]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.010]**
Union 0.185 0.184 0.185 0.184 0.177 0.176 0.169 0.157 0.156 0.162
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
Married 0.148 0.144 0.142 0.141 0.148 0.158 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.128
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Constant -1.441 -1.009 -1.497 -1.637 -1.246 -1.208 -1.48 -1.298 -1.151 -1.215
[0.131]** [0.173]** [0.132]** [0.114]** [0.136]** [0.129]** [0.137]** [0.106]** [0.125]** [0.118]**
Observations 66867 63488 70492 77369 74775 70819 83118 86837 83617 82177
R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.41
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Geographic and econ sector controls not reported.
Table 2.12. ORU Equation Estimation for Males: 1993–2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Age 0.058 0.007 0.009 0.033 0.062 0.047 0.032 0.025 0.039 0.036
[0.012]** [0.012] [0.017] [0.015]* [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.017] [0.014] [0.015]** [0.017]*
Age2/100 -0.044 0.147 0.12 0.026 -0.083 -0.035 0.004 0.032 -0.007 0.003
[0.045] [0.042]** [0.064] [0.058] [0.060] [0.055] [0.063] [0.053] [0.054] [0.065]
Age3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Deficit
Qualif
-0.04 -0.045 -0.046 -0.044 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.044 -0.045 -0.043
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Required
Qualif
0.107 0.103 0.103 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.111 0.112 0.113 0.113
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Surplus
Qualif
0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.039
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Nonwhite -0.149 -0.149 -0.172 -0.182 -0.176 -0.173 -0.172 -0.158 -0.162 -0.158
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
PT, eco-
nomic rea-
sons
-0.197 -0.18 -0.181 -0.195 -0.204 -0.174 -0.155 -0.168 -0.159 -0.214
[0.010]** [0.013]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.017]** [0.014]** [0.017]**
Union 0.169 0.192 0.19 0.216 0.217 0.212 0.201 0.2 0.19 0.196
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Married 0.124 0.121 0.134 0.141 0.14 0.139 0.135 0.132 0.138 0.143
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Constant -1.371 -0.785 -0.773 -1.049 -1.293 -1.065 -0.904 -0.851 -0.986 -0.913
[0.115]** [0.120]** [0.169]** [0.147]** [0.155]** [0.145]** [0.163]** [0.139]** [0.145]** [0.164]**
Observations 80475 80577 53129 55652 56446 56108 53991 53060 55518 59745
R-squared 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.4 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.38 0.37
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Geographic and econ sector controls not included.
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Table 2.13. ORU Equation Estimation for Females: 1983–1992
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Age 0.244 0.246 0.217 0.227 0.192 0.185 0.165 0.164 0.163 0.172
[0.017]** [0.013]** [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.013]**
Age2/100 -0.752 -0.761 -0.65 -0.683 -0.547 -0.521 -0.456 -0.457 -0.443 -0.466
[0.066]** [0.051]** [0.063]** [0.054]** [0.057]** [0.048]** [0.045]** [0.045]** [0.042]** [0.050]**
Age3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Age4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Deficit
Qualif
-0.049 -0.052 -0.052 -0.06 -0.057 -0.057 -0.055 -0.055 -0.055 -0.05
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Required
Qualif
0.097 0.104 0.104 0.107 0.113 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.114 0.111
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Surplus
Qualif
0.044 0.052 0.059 0.058 0.06 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.056 0.053
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Nonwhite -0.072 -0.083 -0.07 -0.076 -0.084 -0.071 -0.069 -0.081 -0.075 -0.08
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
PT,
economic
reasons
-0.206 -0.219 -0.232 -0.234 -0.229 -0.26 -0.206 -0.211 -0.22 -0.241
[0.006]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.008]**
Union 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.155 0.155 0.145 0.125 0.128 0.11 0.105
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Married -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0 -0.001 0.009 0.016 0.01 0.012
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]* [0.004]** [0.004]* [0.004]**
Constant -2.897 -2.967 -2.809 -2.894 -2.676 -2.659 -2.397 -2.386 -2.367 -2.502
[0.150]** [0.125]** [0.149]** [0.132]** [0.137]** [0.119]** [0.114]** [0.114]** [0.113]** [0.128]**
Observations 59767 56496 63452 70964 69715 66236 76695 80895 79036 78068
R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Geographic and econ sector controls not included.
Table 2.14. ORU Equation Estimation for Females: 1993–2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Age 0.157 0.108 0.101 0.13 0.075 0.035 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.131
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.017]**
Age2/100 -0.399 -0.22 -0.215 -0.32 -0.12 0.014 -0.119 -0.075 -0.106 -0.348
[0.040]** [0.038]** [0.072]** [0.070]** [0.046]** [0.045] [0.058]* [0.052] [0.063] [0.061]**
Age3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]**
Age4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]**
Deficit
Qualif
-0.051 -0.063 -0.065 -0.063 -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.061 -0.061 -0.062
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Required
Qualif
0.11 0.114 0.114 0.117 0.117 0.115 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.117
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Surplus
Qualif
0.052 0.05 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.057 0.057 0.06 0.059 0.058
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Nonwhite -0.079 -0.088 -0.087 -0.099 -0.091 -0.087 -0.084 -0.083 -0.093 -0.096
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
PT,
economic
reasons
-0.224 -0.198 -0.227 -0.212 -0.209 -0.205 -0.198 -0.184 -0.223 -0.21
[0.007]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]**
Union 0.107 0.119 0.143 0.151 0.136 0.122 0.135 0.102 0.106 0.098
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Married 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.017 0.019
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]* [0.005] [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]* [0.005] [0.005]** [0.005]**
Constant -2.363 -1.856 -1.774 -2.118 -1.574 -1.102 -1.39 -1.181 -1.472 -2.019
[0.115]** [0.112]** [0.188]** [0.176]** [0.125]** [0.124]** [0.164]** [0.139]** [0.168]** [0.163]**
Observations 77320 77178 51289 54234 55259 54698 52864 51736 54134 58942
R-squared 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Geographic and econ sector controls not included.
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Table 2.15. ORU Estimates for Sub-groups: Males
1983 1992 2002
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Age
16–24 3.21 -2.85 5.16 -0.46 3.05 -1.89 5.37 2.00 3.91 -2.47 6.83 1.41
25–34 5.25 -4.01 6.93 2.97 6.05 -3.49 9.02 3.43 6.78 -4.14 9.53 4.46
35–54 7.06 -4.90 9.72 5.34 7.52 -4.29 11.14 4.97 8.38 -4.55 12.17 4.37
55– 5.72 -3.34 9.62 4.72 6.65 -3.66 11.77 3.66 7.73 -4.02 12.19 2.58
Non-white 6.51 -4.90 8.42 3.99 7.60 -4.53 10.38 4.25 8.48 -5.04 10.84 3.85
White 5.04 -3.48 9.27 3.42 5.26 -3.22 10.31 3.82 6.58 -3.57 12.43 4.13
Manufacturing 7.60 -5.01 12.22 4.82 7.66 -4.35 12.84 5.13 8.55 -4.64 13.26 5.36
Services 5.61 -4.36 7.31 3.35 6.59 -3.91 9.66 3.75 7.61 -4.43 10.84 3.48
Non-union 6.87 -4.62 9.81 4.58 7.15 -3.81 11.36 4.50 8.07 -4.24 12.35 4.05
Union 3.31 -3.45 3.89 1.28 3.97 -3.16 5.25 2.27 3.88 -3.13 4.63 2.63
Table 2.16. ORU Estimates for Sub-groups: Females
1983 1992 2002
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Attained
Ed
Deficit
Ed
Required
Ed
Surplus
Ed
Age
16–24 4.83 -5.46 8.58 0.81 4.98 -3.89 8.69 2.70 5.53 -4.66 7.78 2.38
25–34 7.08 -5.17 9.38 5.05 8.32 -5.38 11.43 5.96 9.00 -6.29 11.54 5.64
35–54 7.21 -4.85 10.11 5.14 8.29 -5.30 11.26 5.71 9.37 -6.37 12.27 6.48
55– 5.95 -4.17 9.86 3.70 6.67 -4.32 11.14 2.92 8.09 -5.50 11.23 4.52
Non-white 7.04 -5.34 9.64 4.17 8.41 -5.46 11.10 5.32 9.61 -7.24 11.58 6.06
White 6.12 -4.08 10.11 5.23 6.82 -4.46 11.70 5.17 7.91 -5.29 12.49 5.16
Manufacturing 6.41 -4.11 11.38 6.27 7.79 -4.62 14.05 7.26 8.56 -4.83 14.24 7.46
Services 6.83 -5.23 9.44 3.97 7.90 -5.14 10.85 4.98 9.05 -6.50 11.58 5.65
Non-union 7.07 -5.15 10.76 4.52 8.15 -5.27 12.31 5.35 9.17 -6.28 12.53 6.01
Union 5.83 -3.96 7.34 3.82 6.40 -4.16 7.55 4.15 7.40 -5.33 8.52 3.76
approach. Thus, the shift to services might offer at least a partial explanation for
why the returns to education have not grown faster during the period. Finally, it
is interesting to note how low the returns are in the union sector. Moreover, it is
in this sector where the returns to attained and required education come closer to
each other. A plausible conclusion is that the Mincerian model is more relevant in
relatively more unionized economies, with lower mismatch rates and low returns to
surplus and deficit education.
2.5 Panel Estimation
A remarkable feature of previous empirical studies that examine the effects on
earnings of educational mismatch is the robustness of their findings, which seem to
hold across different time periods and different countries. A potential problem of
many of the existing studies however is that they employ only cross-section data. It
is thus possible that the results of these studies, as well as the results presented here
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thus far, are biased due to unobserved heterogeneity of individuals. Suppose the real
population level equation is given by:
lnWi,t = Xi,t · γ +
[
Qri,t Q
s
i,t Q
u
i,t
]
·

β1
β2
β3
+ ci + i,t (2.2)
where, as before, W , X and Q represent earnings, individual characteristics and
qualifications and where we have added c—an unobservable individual-level variable
(typically thought of as individual ability level). Because c is usually correlated
with the other regressors, omitting it from the estimating equation—as in equation
2.1—introduces bias in the results. In our particular case, individuals with lower
innate ability might need more education to successfully perform at a job for which
they are formally over-educated. In this case, the returns to surplus and deficit
education in equation 2.1 will be underestimated in absolute value. In other words,
if we controlled for individual heterogeneity, we should expect the return to deficit,
required and surplus schooling to become closer to each other (and potentially the
same if the human capital model is true).
There are several possible solutions for the omitted variable problem, including the
use of proxy and instrumental variables. In addition, if we can observe the same cross-
section units at different points in time, then it is possible consistently to estimate
the γ and β without having to further deal with the unobservable effect (Wooldridge,
2002, ch. 10). In this subsection, we estimate equation 2.2 using pooled OLS, random
and fixed effects panel estimators.
We exploit the particular time structure of the CPS interview system to construct
a weakly balanced panel for the years 1983–2002. CPS respondents are interviewed
for 4 consecutive months, then kept out of the sample for 8 months, and finally
reinserted for 4 months before leaving the sample permanently. Attrition problems
aside, this design should lead to a 75% overlap of respondents across consecutive
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months, and a 50% between the same month of consecutive years. However, because
only the outgoing rotation groups (month in sample 4 and 8) are asked earnings-
related questions, each year the maximum possible panel size is one eighth of the total
CPS sample. This maximum is substantially above the actual fraction of individual
respondents that can be matched across survey years. There are several reasons
for this. On the one hand, there is attrition in the sample due to non-response,
mortality, and migration. On the other hand, there is the unfortunately important
issue of recording errors.
Table 2.17. Merge rates and Sample Restrictions in CPS-ORG Panel
Year Full Merged Matched Employed Non-student Wage-Salary Unedited
1983 174,141 76 71 37 . 31 24
1984 170,053 37 35 19 18 15 12
1985 171,145 18 17 10 9 8 6
1986 168,835 74 69 38 36 31 25
1987 168,763 70 63 36 34 29 22
1988 160,780 73 68 39 37 31 26
1989 163,171 75 70 40 38 32 31
1990 169,257 75 70 40 38 32 30
1991 166,151 75 56 31 30 26 24
1992 164,138 75 60 32 31 26 25
1993 162,699 74 56 31 29 25 24
1994 157,540 29 23 12 12 10 10
1995 158,307 24 19 10 9 8 2
1996 139,473 79 63 34 33 27 18
1997 140,702 78 71 42 40 34 22
1998 140,416 78 65 38 36 31 19
1999 141,527 79 65 38 36 31 18
2000 138,808 79 65 38 37 31 17
2001 149,939 79 61 37 36 31 17
Columns 3–8 expressed as fraction of full sample.
Beginning in 1980, individuals at a point in time are uniquely identified in the
CPS by two variables: a household identified and an individual line number within the
household (for details see Madrian and Lefgren, 1999). In theory, these two identifiers
should remain constant over time. This is not true, however, for the same individual
across time because the same identifier might be given to a different person in case the
original respondent moves away from the housing unit. A third variable is supposed
to register the cases when a new household is interviewed. But recording errors in
the latter variable are very common. Because of these recording errors, matching
individuals across CPS years results both in “false positives”—matches that do not
represent the same individual across time—and “false negatives”—matches that are
not made even when they should have.
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Table 2.17 presents statistics on the matching process for the ORG files 1983–2002.
Column 2 has the starting sample size. The other columns present the percentage of
the initial sample that remains after all previous restrictions apply. The “na¨ıve merge
rate” in column 3 represents all the merges that occur by matching observations from
contiguous years solely on the basis of the three identifiers. These merge rates are
within the range of success of previous studies, with the exception of years 1994-95
(CPS overhaul) and 1984-85. To eliminate the false positives12, we discard from the
sample na¨ıve matches for which the sex or race is different across time, or for which
education and age increase more than one or two years respectively. Eliminating this
estimated false positives leaves us with the match rate in column 4. The other sample
restrictions mirror the ones in the previous section.
Table 2.18. Panel descriptive stats
Males Females
Mean SD
overall
SD
between
SD
within
Mean SD
overall
SD
between
SD
within
Log Earnings 1.83 0.58 0.53 0.23 1.52 0.53 0.49 0.21
Education
Attainment
13.25 2.86 2.86 0.13 13.31 2.57 2.57 0.14
Required
Education
13.49 2.13 2.05 0.55 13.25 2.02 1.94 0.57
Surplus Ed (if
overed)
3.05 1.08 1.02 0.32 3.05 1.11 1.07 0.30
Deficit Ed (if
undered)
3.94 1.96 1.85 0.28 3.62 1.89 1.76 0.26
The resulting panel is weakly balanced. It is balanced because each individual is
observed in exactly two periods. It is only weakly balanced because the periods are
not the same for every individual. In table 2.18 we present descriptive statistics for
the key variables. Of particular importance is the standard deviation of the education
variables within panels, since this is the source of identification for the fixed effect
estimator.
Table 2.19 further explores this aspect of the data. 88% of all individuals do not
change their match status over the two periods. As expected, the most frequent case
12Not much can be done about the false negatives.
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is that of workers who are correctly matched in both periods. The data do not tell us
whether individuals have changed jobs from one year to the next. We take a change
in occupation or industry as an (admittedly imperfect) indicator of job transition.
Not surprisingly the fraction of those whose match status changes over time is higher
in the latter case. Among the possible match status changes, transitions in and out
of correctly matched are also the most frequent. Other reassuring results involve the
high under-education and the near-zero over-education rate for high-schoolers and
dropouts, and the opposite result for workers with advanced degrees. Finally, note
the very high rate of permanence in union jobs.
Table 2.19. Transitions in Match Status
No Change Transitions
Matched
(%)
Overeduc
(%)
Undereduc
(%)
M-0
(%)
U-M
(%)
O-M
(%)
M-U
(%)
O-U
(%)
U-O
(%)
Obs
All Transitions
All workers 67.2 10.02 10.39 3.4 3.07 2.78 2.88 0.13 0.12 758,775
Male 67.44 8.55 12 3.11 3.2 2.54 3.02 0.07 0.07 401,515
Female 66.93 11.69 8.59 3.73 2.92 3.06 2.72 0.19 0.18 357,260
Transitions with occ or ind change
All workers 61.69 9.02 8.57 5.35 4.99 4.86 5.05 0.23 0.23 400,698
Male 62.43 7.46 10.24 4.83 5.22 4.35 5.22 0.12 0.13 216,953
Female 60.82 10.86 6.6 5.97 4.73 5.46 4.85 0.36 0.35 183,745
Transitions by Age group
16-24 75.07 6.41 6.51 2.86 3.63 2.25 3.01 0.16 0.12 63,309
25-44 67.2 11.24 8.49 3.81 2.96 3.17 2.85 0.14 0.13 427,022
45-66 65.66 8.99 13.79 2.93 3.13 2.35 2.93 0.1 0.12 251,517
65- 60.58 8.21 22.31 2.32 2.72 1.5 2.28 0.05 0.03 16,927
Transitions by Education Level
LTHS 38.69 0 52.91 0.01 4.88 0.01 3.51 0 0 86,429
HS 85.95 0 6.58 0.01 3.51 0.01 3.94 0 0 305,443
Some 61.97 13.01 6.06 6.74 4.18 3.96 3.39 0.33 0.37 166,317
College 54.63 25.75 2.26 7.64 1.02 7.36 0.83 0.3 0.23 128,216
Advanced 56.38 29.58 0.07 6.62 0.13 7.02 0.11 0.06 0.02 72,369
Transitions by Minority status
White 68.32 10.16 8.88 3.48 3.1 2.91 2.9 0.13 0.12 596,276
Non-white 63.08 9.53 15.93 3.11 2.96 2.33 2.79 0.14 0.13 162,499
Transitions by Union status
Non-union 65.53 10.4 10.85 3.64 3.28 3 3.06 0.12 0.12 565,082
Union in 1 period
only
67.78 9.02 9.89 3.46 3.29 2.93 3.18 0.25 0.2 70,125
Union in both pe-
riods
74.49 8.89 8.57 2.3 1.97 1.7 1.88 0.09 0.1 123,568
What is the effect of these transitions on earnings? In table 2.20 we see that
workers who did not change their match status—whether they changed their jobs
or not—enjoyed average raises of between 1.4 and 3.8 percent yearly. The picture is
completely different for match status transitions. Moving into (out of) over-education
is generally accompanied with a penalty (prize) on earnings. The opposite is true
about under-education. These results generally confirm our findings from the cross-
section regressions.
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Table 2.20. Changes in log earnings by transition type
No Change Transitions
Matched Overed Undered M-0 U-M O-M M-U O-U U-O
All Transitions
All 0.027 0.032 0.019 -0.013 -0.021 0.092 0.080 0.162 -0.086
Male 0.026 0.027 0.017 -0.013 -0.029 0.086 0.076 0.174 -0.105
Female 0.030 0.036 0.022 -0.013 -0.011 0.097 0.085 0.158 -0.078
Transitions between different industries or occupations
All 0.030 0.035 0.016 -0.019 -0.028 0.098 0.082 0.171 -0.087
Male 0.028 0.032 0.014 -0.019 -0.036 0.090 0.077 0.183 -0.105
Female 0.033 0.038 0.020 -0.020 -0.018 0.106 0.089 0.166 -0.079
Next we estimate equation 2.2. Table 2.21 presents results for pooled OLS, ran-
dom effects and fixed effects estimations. The first two estimators yield results that
are very much in line with the cross-section OLS estimates. However, the standard
Hausman test decisively rejects the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator
is consistent13.
Table 2.21. Panel Regression Results
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled
OLS
RE FE FE restrict Pooled
OLS
RE FE FE
restrict
Attained Ed 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.006** 0.010***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004]
Age 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.068***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.006]
Age2/100 -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.072*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.088***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004]
Deficit Ed -0.059*** -0.068*** -0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.003 -0.008**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004]
Required Ed 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.017*** 0.017***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004]
Surplus Ed 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.004 0.010*** 0.046*** 0.056*** -0.001 0.004
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
Observations 647632 684266 684266 294606 694398 734608 734608 329538
R-squared 0.351 . 0.012 0.022 0.370 . 0.010 0.017
Number of id 342810 342810 147643 367697 367697 164930
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Regressions include controls for married, part
time, public sector, manufacturing, services, union, and year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes nonwhite, metropolitan
area and region dummies.
The fixed effects estimator confirms the basic result found in the recent literature
on skill mismatch. The returns to surplus and deficit qualifications are smaller in
absolute value than the returns to required qualifications. Indeed, deficit education
for females and surplus education in general are not statistically different from zero,
13The test-statistic is 11,891 for males and 12,890 for females. It is distributed under the null
with a chi-square with 11 degrees of freedom (the test was conducted without year dummies to avoid
a not positive-definite covariance matrix).
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which is exactly the result predicted by Thurow’s (1975) model. One problem with
the fixed effects results involves the very low returns to required education. The
reason for the low estimate is the insufficient within-panel variation of the education
variables (see again table 2.18). The problem is even more pronounced for a standard
returns to attained education because there is a lack of variation due to changes in
requirements (we include estimates from the standard Mincer equation in the table
for comparison purposes). The fourth and eighth columns contain estimates for the
occupation or industry change restricted sample. Estimates increase in size somewhat
and the surplus schooling estimate is now significant for females. But the overall result
is the same.
Bauer (2002) and Tsai (2007) conduct similar analysis using panel data14. In both
cases, the fixed effects estimator results in returns to surplus and deficit schooling
that are very close to the returns to required schooling. The conclusion that is drawn
is that, once individual heterogeneity is controlled for, the result common in the
literature on skill mismatch disappears and the human capital model is revalidated.
In the Bauer study the result is based on a modal measure of mismatch, according to
which all individuals below or above the modal education level in a 2-digit occupation
are considered mismatched. Of course, the resulting rates of mismatch are extremely
high: 51% for males and 67% for females. If a majority of workers is mismatched, it
is not surprising that returns to surplus and deficit education approach the returns
to modal education15. The Tsai study is specially interesting for comparison since it
is based on a U.S. survey for a very similar period. Her fixed effects estimates for
the returns to surplus and deficit schooling are very close to the returns to required
14Bauer uses a German panel dataset for the period 1984–1998. Tsai uses the U.S. Panel Study
of Income Dynamics for the period 1979–2005.
15Bauer also estimates the model with a mean-plus-one-standard-deviation measure. In this case
the fixed effects model yields an estimate for the returns to required schooling that is not significantly
different from zero.
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schooling: 0.005 below and 0.01 above respectively. The estimate for the returns to
required education is quite low at 2%16. It is clear that all fixed effects estimations of
earnings equations face the challenge of low within variation of the education variable.
2.6 Conclusion
The rapidly growing proportion of college and post-college educated workers in
the labor force implies a challenge to the labor market’s ability to adapt. The litera-
ture on skill mismatch suggests that (1) an important proportion of workers possess
formal training substantially different from the one required on the job and (2) the
average returns to deficit and surplus years of schooling are lower in absolute value
than the returns to schooling that is required on the job. In this paper we estimate
skill requirements with a one standard deviation range around the median years of
education for each 3-digit occupation in the 1980 census classification. The analysis
is conducted for males and females separately.
Our analysis indicates that over-education rates during the period were around
12% and 17% of the employed labor force for males and females respectively. Under-
education rates were 16% and 12%. Regression estimates at the cross section level
yield results that are quite close to those found in the literature. The returns to
required schooling are substantially higher than the standard returns to attained
education. More importantly, the returns to surplus and deficit schooling are very low
in absolute value and represent only around 45% of the returns to required schooling.
Thus, both the human capital model—which would predict equal returns to adequate,
over- and under-education—and the job competition model—that would predict zero
returns to surplus and deficit years—can be rejected.
16Tsai estimates the equation with a modal measure, obtaining practically the same results as
with the mean measure.
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If unobservable individual ability levels are correlated with observable qualifica-
tions, then OLS estimation is inconsistent. The estimated returns from equation 2.1
are thus suspect of bias due to an omitted variable problem. We work around this
issue by merging consecutive CPS surveys into a panel. Pooled OLS and random
effects estimators are in line with the cross section analysis. However, the Hausman
specification test rejects the null of consistency of these estimators. While the fixed
effects estimator is always consistent, we must face the problem of low within vari-
ation in individual qualification levels. The fixed effects estimates confirm the most
important qualitative result in the literature, namely that surplus and deficit school-
ing have significantly lower returns. Nevertheless, the estimated returns are probably
lower than the true values. All existing attempt to estimate ORU equations with a
fixed effects estimator have to face the problem of low variation of the qualifications
variables within panels. Because larger or longer panels are unlikely to offer substan-
tially more variation, future research that tries to tackle the individual heterogeneity
issue by means other than panel analysis (e.g. natural experiments) is warranted.
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CHAPTER 3
EARNINGS INEQUALITY AND SKILL MISMATCH IN
THE U.S: 1973–2002
3.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades wage inequality in the U.S. has increased. Several
studies have focused on the rise of wage disparities among groups of workers defined
by education attainment and experience in the labor force. Around a third of the
variation in earnings at a point in time can be explained in this way (Levy and Mur-
nane, 1992; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999). Also, changes in the
wage distribution can be explained by the same factors to a significant extent (Fields,
2003). However, residual or within-group wage inequality—i.e wage dispersion among
workers with the same education and experience—is generally believed to account for
most of the increase in overall inequality. One possible explanation for the increase
in residual inequality involves unobservable differences in human capital. If individ-
uals differ in ability levels, then an increase in either the dispersion of those abilities
or the rewards that accrue to them could account for the rise of inequality within
groups. An alternative story not explored in the literature on wage inequality relies
on the dispersion of outcomes within education groups because of the existence of
skill mismatch.
According to assignment and other models, equilibrium in the labor market might
be such that not all workers are allocated to jobs in which their skills are required1.
1Assignment models are reviewed in Sattinger (1993). A skill mismatch equilibrium is also
present in the search model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and the efficiency wage model in Skott
(2006).
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Some workers will be over-educated for their jobs, meaning that the skills they pos-
sess are above those required on the job. Similarly, some workers might have less
qualifications than those required. Normally, over(under)-educated workers will have
lower(higher) returns to human capital than correctly matched workers with the same
levels of skill. An increase in these match differentials or in the overall rates of mis-
match would certainly inflate the residual dispersion in traditional human capital re-
gressions that restrict the returns to surplus and deficit qualifications to be the same
as the returns to qualifications that are actually required on the job. The present
study analyzes to what extent the levels of overall and within-group inequality can
be explained when this type of skill mismatch is taken into consideration. The paper
also considers how changes in skill mismatch and mismatch premia affect the wage
distribution.
Using the method developed in Fields (2003), I show that the explanatory power of
education in accounting for levels of earnings inequality is greater than what it would
appear when skill mismatch is ignored. The differences are in the order of 5 percent,
or almost 20 percent of the total explained variation in earnings. Surplus and deficit
qualifications are roughly equally important in explaining inequality in the male wage
distribution at a point in time, while surplus qualifications are more important for
females. The paper also shows that the increase in over-education rates and premia
in the last 30 years produced a very sharp increase in the relative importance of
surplus qualifications in explaining wage dispersion. Indeed, when looking at changes
in the wage distribution surplus qualifications are very important. Around 10 and 26
percent of the changes in the Gini coefficient for males and females respectively can be
explained by increases in this factor alone. The contribution of deficit qualifications,
however, is almost negligible (these are the main findings of the paper, which can be
found in tables (3.8–3.9) in section 4.
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Starting with Duncan and Hoffman (1981), the empirical literature on skill mis-
match has been centered around the estimation of an equation of the form:
lnWi,t = Xi,t · γt +
[
Qri,t Q
s
i,t Q
d
i,t
]
·

βrt
βst
βdt
+ i,t = Zi,t · αt (3.1)
α′t =
[
γ′t β
r
t β
s
t β
d
i,t 1
]
Zi,t =
[
Xi,t Q
r
i,t Q
s
i,t Q
d
i,t i,t
]
where i and t index individuals and time respectively. Wi,t represents earnings,
which are assumed to have a log-normal distribution (i,t is the random part) con-
ditional on a vector of personal characteristics Xi,t (including a constant and some
function of age or experience) and qualifications Qi,t. The vectors of parameters
to be estimated are γt and βt. The novelty of the approach involves splitting the
qualifications variable into three parts: required (r), surplus (s), and deficit (d) qual-
ifications.2 For convenience, I also introduce here a more succinct notation—using
one matrix (Z) and one vector of parameters (α) only—that will become useful later.
Conditional on choosing and obtaining data for every job’s educational requirements,
equation (3.1) can be estimated using standard multivariate analysis.3
2Details on these qualifications variables are provided below. All on-the-job training is assumed
to be required on the job so no decomposition applies in this case. A similar model has been
estimated (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) that uses attained education and indicator variables for
over- and under-educated workers in the right-hand-side instead of the required, deficit and surplus
schooling variables. The latter model has been criticized because the returns to surplus and deficit
schooling cannot be clearly identified (Cohn, 1992).
3The standard Mincerian approach would correspond to the particular case where βrt = β
s
t =
−βdt , so that required, surplus, and deficit education all receive the same return. The other particular
case of note corresponds to Thurow’s (1975) job competition model, where βst = β
d
t = 0.
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There are several extensive surveys of studies that use this approach (Green et al.,
1999; Hartog, 2000; Sloane, 2003; McGuinness, 2006). As a general rule, all studies
tend to confirm Sicherman’s (1991) stylized facts relating to the earnings of over- and
under-educated workers:
1. The earnings of over-educated workers are less than the earnings of those who
have the same level of education but are in jobs where those qualifications are
required (e.g. a college graduate working at a grocery store earns less on average
than a college graduate who is an investment banker).
2. Over-educated workers’ earnings are however generally above the earnings of
workers in their same occupation or job type, who are perfectly matched qualifications-
wise (i.e., the college graduate in the grocery store tends to earn more than a
high-school graduate occupying a similar position).
3. The earnings of under-educated workers are more than the earnings of those
with the same level of education but who are perfectly matched (e.g. a high-
school graduate who becomes a manager generally earns more than the average
high-school graduate).
4. The co-workers of under-educated workers who have the appropriate formal
training tend to earn more than them.
There is considerable variation in the estimates of the incidence of skill mismatch.
Depending on the measure utilized, the country, the period, and data source, studies
have found rates of over-education ranging from 10 to 42%, with an “un-weighted”
average of 23.3% in the 25 studies summarized by Groot and Maassen van den Brink
(2000). Their average for under-education is 14.4%.4 Rubb (2003) provides a con-
sistent meta-analysis of 85 estimates of the β parameters. The return to required
4The standard deviations are quite high: 9.9 and 8.2 percentage points respectively.
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education is 9.6% on average. Each year of surplus schooling yields 5.2%. Finally,
deficit qualifications take away 4.8% from the required education returns.
These figures seem significant enough to motivate the suspicions that (i) skill
mismatch accounts for a significant part of earnings inequality, and (ii) changes in
skill mismatch and match premia might have contributed to the observed changes in
the wage distribution. However, the link between skill mismatch and wage inequality
has not been researched so far. In the methodology developed in Fields (2003), these
two points correspond to the “levels” and the “differences” questions respectively.
The first question can be answered through a decomposition of earnings inequality
into relative factor inequality weights, each of which measure the importance of the
factor in explaining earnings inequality at a point in time. The important levels
question in this paper is: how large are the factor inequality weights of surplus and
deficit qualifications? A related question is whether the exclusion of these variables
from the analysis, as is usually done in studies of earnings inequality, matters at all
(I show that it does). The second question is similarly addressed with the use of
differential factor inequality weights. I show that the evolution of these weights in
the case of surplus and deficit qualifications is tightly linked to changes in over- and
under-education rates and depth, as well as to the returns that accrue to surplus and
deficit schooling.
In the next section, I start by discussing the data and my methodology to measure
the mismatch variables. Section three introduces the decomposition of overall wage
inequality into relative factor inequality weights. This decomposition has the advan-
tage of being generalizable to an important class of inequality indexes.5 Here and
throughout I conduct the analysis for males and females separately. The fourth sec-
tion addresses the differences question. Because different inequality measures behave
5The main conditions are that the index be continuous and symmetric. Detailed conditions can
be found in Fields (2003) and Shorrocks (1982).
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differently (including cases when some measures increase and others fall) the differen-
tial weights differ across inequality indexes. I analyze five different measures: the gini
coefficient, the coefficient of variation, and the 90–10, 90–50 and 50–10 wage gaps.
The objective of the section is not only to determine which factors have contributed
most to changes in each of the inequality measures but also whether the contribu-
tion proceeded mostly from changes in regression coefficients or from changes in the
factors’ variance. In particular, we are interested in trying to tell apart the effect of
increases in the prevalence and the depth of mismatch from the effect of changes in
the returns to surplus and deficit qualifications.
The paper also looks at residual inequality. Section five first asks whether the
introduction of skill mismatch in the specification of the earnings equation changes
the observed patterns of residual dispersion. I find that while within-group inequality
is slightly diminished, the well-known upward trend of within-group inequality is still
present. Lemieux (2006a) finds that much of the increase in residual inequality is
due to changes in the composition of the labor force. Within group inequality is
higher among more educated and older workers, whose share in the labor force has
increased. I then investigate whether the composition effects still remain when the
residuals come from equation (3.1) rather than the standard Mincerian version. The
concluding section summarizes the findings.
3.2 Measurement issues
In this section, I describe how the qualifications variables are constructed and
briefly describe the data sources utilized. I also present a descriptive analysis of the
prevalence of over- and under-education.
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3.2.1 Skill Requirements Measure
There is consensus regarding the difficulty of measuring skill requirements. Re-
searchers have used three main approaches, all of which have advantages and draw-
backs.6 In the present study skill requirements are measured using the job-analysis or
“objective” method. This measure relies on systematic evaluation by professional job
analysts who specify the required level of skills for the job titles in an occupational
classification. In the United States this information is available in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT, U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, 1991). One prob-
lem with the DOT is that it provides a variety of alternative measures of job-skill
requirements. Cognitive, interactive and motor skill indices are linked to consistent
employment matrices (267 occupations and 64 industries). The most often used mea-
sure of workplace skills is called “General Educational Development” (GED). On a
scale of one to six, GED measures mathematical, language and reasoning skills for
each job title.7 The DOT has clear definitions and detailed measurement instructions
that all analysts are supposed to follow. Unfortunately, carrying out such detailed
analysis is very expensive, so the DOT is published only at very wide time intervals
(1977 and 1991 are the last two years for which there is data). Moreover, later edi-
tions do not completely renovate the data. Rather, the new research mostly focuses
on new categories leaving the description and analysis of occupations already con-
tained in previous editions almost intact.8 An implication is that longitudinal studies
require extra assumptions about the behavior of the measures for the years for which
there is no data.
6Slonimczyk (2008a) has a brief review of the three methods and their comparative advantages
and disadvantages. More extensive discussions can be found in Green et al. (1999) and Chevalier
(2003).
7An analysis of the trends in the GED and other DOT measures of required skills can be found
in Wolff (2000).
8Spenner (1985) reviews the quality of this type of skill requirement assessment.
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Given the estimate for Qr the other two qualifications variables are defined as
follows:
Qsi,t = 1
(
Ei,t −Qri,t > l
) · (Ei,t −Qri,t)
Qdi,t = 1
(
Qri,t − Ei,t > l
) · (Qri,t − Ei,t)
where 1(“x”) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the statement “x” is true and 0
otherwise, and Ei,t is education measured in years of formal schooling. The parameter
l is a positive number representing a chosen level of tolerance to mismatch that might
or might not depend on individual characteristics.9 I set l = 1.10
3.2.2 Data
With the exception of the skill requirements measure, the data come from the
NBER extracts of the CPS earnings files for the period 1973–2002. During 1973–78
earnings related questions were asked to the full CPS sample only in May. Starting
in 1979, earnings questions have been asked every month to around a fourth of the
sample (the outgoing rotation groups (ORG) in CPS jargon). Details on the treatment
of the CPS data are discussed in separate appendix. Here I only briefly discuss how
the May and ORG earning supplements are processed. As in most other studies of
earnings inequality, the sample is restricted to employed wage and salary workers.
Only individuals between 16 and 64 years of age with positive potential experience
are kept. In trying to cope with the high non-response rates for the earnings module,
starting in 1979 the BLS has allocated earnings to non-respondents by means of a
hot-deck imputation method. Because earnings were not allocated to non-respondents
during 1973-78, observations with imputed earnings have to be ignored to keep the
9If l depends on individual characteristics such as occupation or industry then it is more appro-
priate to speak of a tolerance function. Also note that if l > 0, correctly matched individuals will
have Qr in the range [Ei,t − l, Ei,t + l].
10Within a reasonable range the results reported here are robust to different choices for this
parameter.
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series consistent over the whole period. I also drop observations for 1994 and the first
eight months of 1995, a period during which allocation flags are not available.
The earnings variable we use is constructed to represent real hourly earnings
including overtime, tips and commissions. A known advantage of the May/ORG
CPS earnings data is that it provides a point-in-time measure of earnings. Hourly
earnings are weekly earnings including overtime, tips and commissions divided by
usual weekly hours, except in the case when a separate (and higher) hourly rate
is provided. Earnings are deflated using the CPI-U-X1 series. As in most of the
literature on earnings inequality, I multiply the sampling weights by usual weekly
hours so as to make the sample of hourly earnings representative of the total hours
worked in the economy. I also adjust—“winsorize”—topcoded earnings, multiplying
them by 1.4. After the 1994 CPS overhaul respondents with variable hours are allowed
to answer that their weekly “hours vary”. I use a method developed by Schmitt (2003)
to allocate weekly hours to these workers.
The educational attainment variable is also of great importance in this study. In
1992 the education item in the CPS questionnaire was modified. Previously individ-
uals had been asked for the highest completed grade of schooling (in years). The new
item asks for the highest degree obtained. In 1998 a new battery of questions was
added that permit determining the highest grade completed in most cases. I follow
the imputation procedure developed by Jaeger (1997a, 2003) to obtain a consistent
measure of the highest grade completed over the whole period.11
During the period 1973–82 the CPS used the industrial and occupational classifi-
cation of the 1970 census. The 1980 census classifications are available during for the
rest of the period under analysis. Minor changes were introduced in the classifications
11The exception is for individuals with at least some college in the years 1992-7. Details in the
appendix.
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in 1991, so we adjust the occupation variable in the years prior to the change to retain
continuity.
As in Vaisey (2006), I use the database compiled by Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003) as a source for the required qualifications variable.12 Thanks to work done
by the U.S. Census Bureau personnel, DOT job title codes and some estimates of
required qualifications were added to a CPS file. For each occupation, Autor et al.
calculated weighted sample means of the GED scores. Independent measures for
males and females are available, so the problem generated by the heterogeneity of
jobs and requirements within occupations is at least partially taken care of.
I use the 3-digit 1970 and 1980 occupational classification to merge the GED
scores to the CPS data for the years 1977 and 1991 respectively. Only the highest
of the three GED scores is binding, so I drop the other two. GED values in years
other than 1977 and 1991 are obtained through linear interpolation.13 A final problem
involves converting the GED score into the “years of education” unit of measurement.
Vaisey (2006) solves the problem using a separate dataset containing both the 3-digit
occupational codes and self-reported (subjective) education requirements measured
in years of education. The functional form that best maps GED scores into the
education requirements variable is a cubic polynomial, which can then be used to
convert GED scores for other years. I follow the same approach.
3.2.3 Mismatch rates
Figure (3.1) shows the joint distribution of required qualifications and education
at the beginning and the end of the period. To make both years of data comparable,
I use a random sub-sample of 2002 workers so that both scatter plots have roughly
12Prof. Autor, Levy, and Murnane generously shared these data with Prof. Vaisey, who kindly
let me use it too.
13All the findings reported in this study remain qualitatively identical if the dataset is restricted
to the years 1977 and 1991.
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the same number of dots. It is clear that workers with higher qualifications tend to
be allocated to jobs with higher requirements. If workers also tended to be correctly
matched, the observations would be aligned along the 45 degree lines. However, the
slopes from the simple OLS regressions of required qualifications on education are
around 0.6.
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Figure 3.1. Required Qualifications and Education
Both for females and for males it is possible to discern two trends. First, the
labor force has become more educated. Second, a much higher proportion of workers
have fallen below the 45 degree line, leading to higher over-education rates. The latter
point is confirmed by figure (3.2), which shows the evolution of mismatch rates during
1973–2002. Over-education rates for males and females follow a remarkably similar
path, starting in 1973 at around 15% and increasing constantly throughout the period
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to reach levels of around 35% of the employed labor force. Under-education, on the
contrary, follows a downward trend.
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Figure 3.2. Mismatch Rates 1973–2002
Tables (3.1) and (3.2) present descriptive statistics for the most important vari-
ables used in the analysis below. Earnings decreased on average for males in the
sample and increased for females. As mentioned above, education attainment grew
significantly throughout the period. Skill requirements grew as well but at a much
slower pace. Interestingly, there are no strong differences between skill requirements
for males and for females. The changes in mismatch rates are reflected on average
surplus and deficit qualifications, with the former increasing constantly and the latter
decreasing in almost every subperiod.
3.3 The Levels Question
Wage inequality in the U.S. has increased significantly in the last three decades. As
shown in figure (3.3), measures of overall inequality in log earnings for males like the
Gini coefficient, the coefficient of variation, and the 90–10 percentile gap increased
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics: Males
1973 1983 1992 2002
lnW 1.91 1.79 1.77 1.88
0.49 0.52 0.56 0.57
E 11.90 12.85 13.23 13.50
3.14 2.94 2.94 3.02
Overeducated 15.6% 25.3% 31.1% 33.5%
Undereducated 21.8% 12.2% 8.8% 8.9%
Qr 12.27 12.44 12.45 12.60
2.04 2.03 2.04 2.11
Qs 0.49 0.82 1.03 1.14
1.21 1.51 1.66 1.73
Qd 0.89 0.49 0.37 0.37
1.91 1.48 1.37 1.34
Age 36.93 36.17 36.77 38.51
12.73 12.02 11.14 11.47
Married 79.7% 70.5% 64.6% 63.0%
Non-white 14.6% 17.4% 22.6% 28.2%
Part-time 1.6% 3.5% 3.3% 2.3%
Public Sector 15.6% 16.0% 15.0% 13.4%
Manufacturing 34.5% 29.6% 26.1% 20.9%
Services 62.8% 67.5% 71.3% 76.7%
Sample Size 23,078 76,746 72,192 59,765
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous vari-
ables are in italics under the sample means.
by around 20% during the period.14 The Gini, for example, increased from 0.144
in 1973 to 0.174 in 2002. This is a very significant change for earnings inequality,
which usually moves slowly. The timing of the change is also interesting. Inequality
remained practically constant during the 70s and then had an explosive period of
growth during the first half of the 80s. The increase in inequality then slowed down
until the early 90s, and finally remained constant or slightly decreased during the
remaining years. A quite different story can be told if one looks at inequality in
the upper and the lower-tiers of the distribution separately. After the calm 70s, the
90–50 percentile gap increased sharply like the other measures. However, with the
exception of a brief decline around 1987 the growth in inequality in the upper tier
continued at the same pace into the 90s. The series is practically flat during 1992–97
14Growth rates are calculated as log differences. For the percentile gaps, the growth rates corre-
spond to the difference between the rates of growth of the corresponding percentile wages.
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics: Females
1973 1983 1992 2002
lnW 1.51 1.47 1.55 1.69
0.44 0.45 0.50 0.53
E 12.01 12.88 13.42 13.79
2.65 2.50 2.59 2.73
Overeducated 15.5% 22.4% 30.5% 34.8%
Undereducated 14.3% 8.6% 6.7% 7.7%
Qr 11.99 12.32 12.49 12.66
1.95 1.89 1.93 2.06
Qs 0.46 0.73 1.03 1.20
1.13 1.44 1.66 1.78
Qd 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.26
1.39 1.05 0.99 1.00
Age 36.73 35.64 36.96 38.98
13.32 12.11 11.19 11.71
Married 65.2% 59.3% 56.2% 54.6%
Non-white 17.0% 19.2% 22.6% 27.9%
Part-time 2.7% 5.8% 4.4% 2.7%
Public Sector 22.2% 20.5% 20.5% 20.2%
Manufacturing 23.4% 18.4% 15.0% 10.6%
Services 75.9% 80.9% 84.2% 88.6%
Sample Size 15,929 67,979 69,516 59,724
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous vari-
ables are in italics under the sample means.
but then continues growing at a fast pace. In contrast, the 90–10 gap started growing
earlier and faster but then decreased sharply after 1987. By 2002, inequality in the
left half of the earnings distribution was only slightly higher than in 1973. For males,
increasing inequality in the right half of the wage distribution explains almost all of
the growth in the 90–10 percentile gap. Indeed, the wage distribution for males was
slightly left-skewed at the beginning of the period but significantly right-skewed at
the end.
Earnings inequality among women behaved quite differently, as can be seen in
figure (3.4). After falling during the 70s, the Gini and the coefficient of variation
increased during the early 80s but then stagnated and eventually decreased slightly
toward the end of the period. The overall increase was only around half that expe-
rienced by the same measures for males (the female Gini went from 0.161 to 0.178).
In contrast, the 90–10 gap increased much more—by around 30%—and actually sur-
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passed the increase experienced by males in the same measure. The difference comes
entirely from the lower tail of the female wage distribution, which literally collapsed
during the early 80s and never recovered.
3.3.1 Relative Factor Inequality Weights
A necessary step before we can focus on explaining these changes involves looking
into the factors that cause inequality at each point in time. Assuming equation
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(3.1) is the true income generating function, the variance of log earnings—calculated
over individuals at a point in time—can be decomposed into a sum of covariances as
follows:
σ2(lnW ) = σ2(
J+2∑
j=1
aj · zj) =
J+2∑
j=1
cov(zj · aj, lnW ) (3.2)
where aj is the j
th element of vector a, the OLS estimate of α defined above.
There are J+2 columns (zj) in the matrix Z, corresponding to J variables or factors,
a column of ones for the constant, and the residuals (the OLS “estimates” of the error
term ). Using the definition of the correlation coefficient and a little more algebra
yields:
Sj =
aj · σ(zj) · cor(zj, lnW )
σ(lnW )
(3.3)
J+2∑
j=1
Sj = 100%
where Sj—the relative factor inequality weight associated with factor j in matrix
Z—represents the fraction of earnings variance that can be attributed to that factor.
Each Sj has two building blocks. To see this point more clearly it is useful to look at
the case where all factors are orthogonal15:
Sj =
a 2j · σ2(zj)
σ2(lnW )
(3.4)
On one hand, the factor’s potential to explain the variance in earnings depends
on the degree of variation in the factor itself. This aspect is represented by the
standard deviation of the factor (σ(zj)). On the other hand, the effect of the variation
15When all regressors are orthogonal aj =
cov(zj ,lnW )
σ2(zj)
.
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in the factor on earnings inequality is limited by the extent to which the two are
statistically associated. The latter aspect is represented by the regression coefficient
aj for the factor. The relative factor inequality weights provide information not
given by classical regression analysis. A regression provides a measure of statistical
association of the dependent variable with each of the regressors but no information
on the extent to which the regressor can explain variability in the dependent variable.
For example, many studies have shown that the returns to required qualifications
(around 9 to 10 percent) estimated using earnings regressions are higher than those
of surplus qualifications (2 to 5 percent). The difference between their respective
factor inequality weights, however, is much higher as I show below. The reason is
that the variability in requirements is greater than in surplus qualifications. Also note
that, because by definition the residual is not correlated with any of the regressors, the
sum of the first J + 1 relative factor inequality weights is the R2 from the regression.
I estimate relative factor inequality weights for three versions of equation (3.1).
In the baseline version I include a full set of age dummies16 but I do not allow
for non-linearities in the qualifications variables. The second specification splits the
qualifications variables into dummies too.17 Finally, the third specification allows
for non-linearities and also includes a number of extra controls: non-white, married,
industry (3 sectors), part-time, and public sector indicators, and 9 region dummies.
For comparison purposes, I also estimate the same equations using the standard
16The rationale for including dummies rather than a polynomial in age is that the right functional
form appears to have changed in time. A quadratic function seems to fit well the beginning half of
the series but a quartic in age seems more appropriate for later years (these changes are analyzed
in detail in Lemieux, 2006b). If a factor enters into the equation as a string of dummies, then the
relative factor inequality weight associated with it is just the sum of the inequality weights calculated
for each of the dummies.
17The categories are 0–8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13–15, 16, and 17–18 years of required schooling; 0, 2, 3,
4, 5, and 6 or more years for surplus education; and 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 or more years for deficit
education.
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human capital specification (with actual qualifications instead of required, surplus,
and deficit qualifications as regressor).18
Tables (3.3) and (3.4) present my estimates for the relative inequality weights
under the six variations, for males and females respectively. In answering the levels
question I focus on the most recent data. The main findings are very similar for males
and females. In the standard earnings equation, education appears as the factor with
the greatest explanatory power. At least a fifth of earnings inequality for males and
a fourth for females can be explained with this single factor. The age factor—a proxy
for experience in the labor market—is a far second, explaining 10–14 or 7–8 percent
of inequality for males and females respectively. All the control factors taken together
explain less earnings inequality than the age factor. These results are roughly in line
with those found in Fields (2003).
3.3.2 Restricted and Unrestricted Estimates
Are these estimates trustworthy? In order to answer this question it is useful to
think of the estimate for the regression coefficient of the attained education factor
as a restricted estimate of the coefficient of the required qualifications factor. As
mentioned above, the restriction being imposed is that βr = βs =−βd. A standard
result in econometrics is that the restricted OLS estimators are unbiased and efficient
if the restrictions are true but biased otherwise.19 Conditional on the estimates of
equation (3.1) being consistent20, the validity of the restriction can be assessed with
an F-test. Such a test unequivocally rejects the null hypothesis of true restrictions
18The categories for the standard education variable are 0–4, 5–8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13–15, 16, and
17–18.
19See, for example, Johnston and DiNardo (1997, ch.3)
20The estimates could be inconsistent if, for example, equation (3.1) omitted a relevant variable.
Slonimczyk (2008a) estimates equation (3.1) using a panel of matched CPS individuals. The fixed
effects estimates, which control for any time-constant observed or unobserved characteristic of the
individuals, yield results qualitatively similar to those obtained in cross-section studies. The esti-
mates are attenuated, however, probably due to measurement error. But the hypothesis of equal
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at the 1% level of significance for all periods both for males and females.21 If the
restrictions are not true all of the restricted estimates are biased, including those not
apparently affected by the restrictions.22 Note that the factor inequality weight of
education is not the restricted factor inequality weight of required qualifications. By
definition, the relative factor inequality weight of education (equation (3.3)) is:
S∗E =
1
σ2 (lnW )
· br∗ · cov
(
Qr +Qs −Qd, lnW)
=
1
σ2 (lnW )
· cov(br∗Qr + bs∗Qs + bd∗Qd, lnW)
=
1
σ2 (lnW )
∑
i=r,s,d
cov
(
bi∗Q
i, lnW
)
=
∑
i=r,s,d
S∗Qi
where again an asterisk denotes restricted estimates. Thus, while it is correct to
compare bE∗ with b
r, one should compare S∗E with
∑
SQi . Letting ΨE denote the true
population level relative factor inequality weight of education, the bias in S∗E when
the restrictions are false is given by:
E
(
S∗E
)−ΨE = 1
σ2
(
lnW
) ·{[E(br∗)− βr]cov(Qr, lnW)+
+
[
E
(
bs∗
)− βs]cov(Qs, lnW)−[
E
(
bd∗
)− βd]cov(Qd, lnW)} (3.5)
required, surplus, and (minus) deficit qualifications coefficients could still be rejected at low levels
of significance.
21The tests were conducted using the linear specification only. Testing each of the two restrictions
separately gave the same result.
22The equation with the standard education variable does indeed yield restricted estimates for
βs and βd. Of course, if b∗ is the vector of restricted estimates for the qualifications variables:
bE∗ =b
s
∗=−bd∗.
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where E, the expectations operator, is not to be confused with the education
variable E. If in reality βr>βs≈−βd the biases in br∗ and bd∗ will be negative while
the bias in bs∗ will be positive. Because in practice cov
(
Qd, lnW
)
< 0, the overall
bias in S∗E will be negative.
23 Looking again at tables (3.3) and (3.4), in the period
2000–02 the differences between SE and S
∗
E in the linear specification were 5.2 and
4.5 percent for males and females respectively. In the other specifications the differ-
ences are quite lower. For males, the differences were 3.77 and 3.57 percent in the
second and third specifications respectively. The same magnitudes for females were
2.47 and 2.49 percent. Of course, bias attenuation is to be expected in the more
flexible specifications. Summing up, the available evidence suggests that the overall
effect of education on earnings inequality is larger than what it would appear in the
standard (restricted) approach. The magnitude of the additional explanatory power
is significant if weighed against the restricted estimates and very large if compared to
the explanatory power of the other factors included in the analysis (lumped together
as “other controls”).
An additional problem with S∗E is that it does not permit analyzing the relative
contributions of required, surplus, and deficit qualifications to explaining earnings
inequality. If the restrictions were true and match premia did not exist, the relative
contributions of these factors would closely follow their relative variabilities. The
relative contribution of required qualifications would typically be around 73 and 79
percent of the total explanatory power of the qualifications factors for males and fe-
males respectively.24 At the other extreme, if surplus and deficit years commanded
zero returns all of the explanatory power of education would be due to the quali-
23The other two covariances are generally positive. Because the covariances of surplus and deficit
qualifications with log earnings tend to be similar in absolute value, the inequality weight of required
qualifications is always quite close to S∗E .
24This relative contribution is simply S
∗
Qr
S∗E
= cov(Q
r,lnW )
cov(E,lnW ) .
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fications that are required on the job. Neither restriction appears to be true and
reality seems to be quite close to a strict middle ground. The relative contribution
of required qualifications averaged around 85 and 90 percent during 1973–2002 for
males and females respectively.
3.3.3 Mismatch Premia
The factor inequality weights of surplus and deficit qualifications measure the
proportion of the variation in earnings that is explained by skill mismatch. This
point can be made clearer if the factor inequality weights are linked to the mismatch
premia. Define the premia associated with having surplus or deficit qualifications as
the average difference between the log wages mismatched workers actually earn and
what they would earn if they only had the qualifications that are required on their
jobs (which are assumed constant). Simply put:
−→
piV =
1
K
∑
Qs 6=0
[(
βrQr + βsQs
)− βrQr] = βs · −→Qs (3.6)
←−
piU =
1
H
∑
Qd 6=0
[(
βrQr + βdQd
)− βrQr] = βd · ←−Qd (3.7)
where K and H are the total counts and −→x and←−x represent the average value of
x for over- and under-educated workers respectively. Note that the mismatch premia
depend on the average over- and under-education depth but not on over- and under-
education rates. The other important component are the coefficients βs,d. The higher
the rewards to surplus qualifications and the penalties to deficit qualification, the
higher the premia to mismatched workers.25 A little more work will prove useful.
Mean surplus and deficit qualifications are given by:
25We discuss only the empirically relevant case: βR > βS > 0, βR > −βD > 0, −→Qs > 0, and←−
Qd > 0.
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Qs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Qsi =
1
N
∑
Qs>0
Qsi =
−→
Qs
K
N
(3.8)
Qd =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Qdi =
1
N
∑
Qd>0
Qdi =
←−
Qd
H
N
(3.9)
where N is the total number of individuals. Note that K/N and H/N are the
over- and under-education rates, which from now on we denote as V and U . Equation
(3.8) simply states that average surplus qualifications in the population is equal to
a fraction V of mean surplus years among the over-qualified. A similar statement is
true about under-qualified workers. The variances can be written as:
σ2Qs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
Qsi −Qs
)2
=
1
N
[∑
Qs>0
(
Qsi − V
−→
Qs
)2
+
∑
Qs=0
V 2
(−→
Qs
)2]
σ2Qd =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
Qdi −Qd
)2
=
1
N
∑
Qd>0
(
Qdi − U
←−
Qd
)2
+
∑
Qd=0
U2
(←−
Qd
)2
a little algebra yields:
σ2Qs =
1
N
∑
Qs>0
(
Qsi
)2 − V 2 · (−→Qs)2 = V · −−−→(Qs)2 − V 2 · (−→Qs)2 (3.10)
σ2Qd =
1
N
∑
Qd>0
(
Qdi
)2 − U2 · (←−Qd)2 = U · ←−−−(Qd)2 − U2 · (←−Qd)2 (3.11)
Using again the formula for factor inequality weights in the orthogonal case (equa-
tion (3.4)) and substituting with equations (3.6–3.7) and (3.10–3.11), we get:
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SQs =
1
σ2lnW
[
V ·
−−−→(
piV
)2 − V 2 · (−→piV )2] (3.12)
SQd =
1
σ2lnW
[
U ·
←−−−(
piU
)2 − U2 · (←−piU)2] (3.13)
Thus, the factor inequality weights of surplus and deficit qualifications are direct
simple functions of the mismatched individuals’ premia and the mismatch rates. The
higher the premia in absolute value, the more earnings inequality gets generated. In
other words, equations (3.12–3.13) say that the contribution of mismatch to overall
inequality is directly dependent on the extent to which workers’ salaries differ from
what they would earn were their qualifications adjusted to match requirements.26
26The factor inequality weights of surplus and deficit qualifications measure the contribution of
each factor to explaining earnings inequality relative to an hypothetical situation in which, given the
existing jobs and requirements, workers had qualifications that exactly matched those requirements.
Because surplus and deficit qualifications are to some extent rewarded, those qualifications increase
overall inequality. A different interpretation would be necessary if instead of equation (3.1) we had
specified:
lnWi,t = Xi,t · γt +
[
Ei,t Q
s
i,t Q
d
i,t
] ·
 δEtδst
δdt
+ i,t (3.14)
It is not difficult to show that the two specifications are equivalent, only that δE = βr, δs = βs−βr,
and δd = βr + βd. The factor inequality weight of Qs would in this case be negative! The reason is
that the existence of over-education reduces inequality relative to a situation in which requirements
are upgraded to meet the existing supply of skills, all other things equal. The corresponding match
premia—the average difference between the counterfactual log wages that mismatched workers would
receive if they became correctly matched due to changes in requirements and the log wages they
actually get—are:
−→
pi′V =
1
K
∑
Qs 6=0
[
δEE − (δEE + δsQs)] = (βr − βs)−→Qs (3.15)
←−
pi′U =
1
H
∑
Qd 6=0
[
δEE − (δEE + δdQd)] = −(βr + βd)←−Qd (3.16)
The fact that these match premia and the mismatch premia defined above both have the same
relationships with earnings inequality exemplifies well the general principle that when assessing a
causal relationship it is fundamental to clearly state the counter-factual state. Equation (3.1) and
equation (3.14) both lead to different but correct evaluations of the effect of mismatch on earnings
inequality based on opposite counterfactuals. However, there is a problem with equation (3.14)
because the resulting S′E has no useful interpretation. Why would we want to know how much
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Table 3.5. Mismatch Depth and Match Premia
Males Females
1973 2002 1973 2002−→
Qs 3.17 3.40 2.99 3.47−→
piV 9.1% 17.7% 12.7% 22.1%←−
Qd 4.09 4.18 3.59 3.33←−
piU -19.0% -21.7% -16.2% -18.1%
Coming back to empirics, tables (3.3–3.4) show that toward the end of the period
surplus qualifications explained around 1.9 and 3.2 percent of earnings inequality for
males and females respectively. The same figures for deficit qualifications were 2.3
and 1.4 percent. Part of the difference between the surplus and deficit qualifications
weights come from the relative prevalence of the phenomena. We have discussed
how by 2002 over-education rates were much higher than under-education rates. It
is then surprising that, at least for males, the factor inequality weight of deficit
qualifications is higher than the weight of surplus qualifications. The reason can be
found in table (3.5). For males, the penalty associated with being under-qualified
is on average substantially larger than the premium of being over-qualified. The
situation is reversed for women, which explains why SQs > SQd in this case.
The most interesting fact regarding the factor inequality weights of surplus and
deficit qualifications is how the former has increased enormously while the latter
decreased. We address this issue in the broader context of changes in the earnings
distributions.
3.4 The Differences Question
In the previous section we estimated factor inequality weights to answer the ques-
tion of which factors are most important in explaining earnings inequality at a point
earnings inequality would be explained by education if, given their current qualifications, all workers
were correctly matched?
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in time. Here we investigate whether these factors can explain changes in inequality
over time.
The inequality weight of required qualifications increased consistently during the
period, although growth was concentrated in the 80s. The increase was much more
pronounced for males than for for females. Deficit qualifications explains relatively
more of the inequality in earnings during the 70s than the 80s. This change is in line
with what one would expect considering the declining trend of under-education over
time. However, this factor’s inequality weight rebounds (in the 80s for males and
90s for females) and ends at levels close to that of the beginning of the period. The
explanatory power of surplus qualifications, on the contrary, increased monotonically
throughout the period.
Two questions naturally arise from these findings. First, what accounts for these
extraordinary changes in the factor inequality weights? For males, the explanatory
power of required qualifications almost doubled in 30 years. Depending on the spec-
ification, their surplus qualification weight increased from a negligible 0.3 at the be-
ginning of the period to the more substantial 1.9 percent in 2000–02. The increase in
the weight for required qualifications was less dramatic for women probably in part
because this factor was relatively more important at the beginning of period, while
their surplus qualifications weight increased by 5 to 6 times. The second question is
whether these factors’ magnitudes are significant enough to explain the changes in
earnings inequality reviewed above.
3.4.1 Differences in Factor Inequality Weights
It is possible to decompose the changes in factor inequality weights over time.27
Logarithmically differentiating Sj (defined in equation (3.3)), we get:
27The decomposition is only exact for infinitesimal changes.
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Sˆj = aˆj + ˆσ(zj) + ˆcor(zj, lnW )− ˆσ(lnW ) (3.17)
where xˆ stands for the percentage rate of growth of x. As noted in Fields (2003),
this decomposition has the problem that aj and cor(zj, lnW ) are not independent.
One way around this problem is to look at the decomposition that would result if
all the factors were orthogonal (see again equation (3.4)). We would then have the
decomposition:
Sˆj = 2 · aˆj + 2 · ˆσ(zj)− 2 · ˆσ(lnW ) (3.18)
This decomposition will be inexact to the extent that factors are not orthogonal
but would still provide a useful benchmark.
Tables (3.6) and (3.7) look at the rates of growth of factor inequality weights and
their components for the period 1973–2002.28 The required qualifications inequality
weight grew faster for males than for females, so the gap in the explanatory power
of this factor was practically closed by the end of the period despite the fact that
initially women had a weight that almost doubled that of men. The growth rate of
skill requirements is mostly accounted for by the growth in the degree of association
with log earnings rather than by an increase in the standard deviation. Using the first
decomposition (equation (3.17)) we see that the growth rates of the regression coeffi-
cient and the correlation between education and log earnings for males each account
for more than 100 percent of the rate of growth in the inequality weight of skill re-
quirements. The second decomposition (equation (3.18)) confirms this observation.29
28Here we focus on the specifications where education and the mismatch variables enter as linear
terms. In the more flexible specifications some of the dummies have negative weights, which makes
it impossible to calculate the rate of growth.
29Note that the second decomposition never adds up to 100% because factors are not really
orthogonal.
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The surplus qualifications weights increased at extraordinary rates of 182 and 173
percent for males and females respectively. In this case the decompositions are more
balanced, with the growth in dispersion of surplus qualifications accounting for 20
and 26 percent of the growth in the inequality weights (decomposition 1) for males
and females respectively. If we used decomposition 2, then the dispersion elements
would appear to account for even a greater fraction of this growth. Finally, the
deficit qualifications inequality weight fell during the period despite the fact that the
association between deficit qualification and earnings increased. The decompositions
show this point by assigning net negative contributions to the regression coefficient
and the correlation between deficit qualifications and earnings.
While the decompositions given by equations (3.17) and (3.18) are useful, they
beg the question when it comes to the surplus and deficit qualifications factors. What
would be desirable is to link changes in SQs and SQd to changes in mismatch rates
and depth. Differentiating equation (3.12) we get:
∂SQs
∂
−→
Qs
=
2
(
βs
)2 · −→Qs · V (1− V )
σ2lnW
(3.19)
∂SQs
∂βs
=
2
(−→
Qs
)2 · βs · V (1− V )
σ2lnW
(3.20)
Thus, an increase in the over-education premium that comes either through an
increase in surplus qualifications depth or through higher returns to surplus years of
education would tend to increase overall inequality. In turn, the effect on earnings
inequality of a change in the prevalence of over-education is given by:
∂SQs
∂V
=
−−−→
(piV )2 − 2V ·
(−→
piV
)2
σ2lnW
(3.21)
which is always positive as long as mismatch rates are below 50%. The analysis
for under-education is identical but note that because in practice βd < 0 an increase
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Table 3.6. Changes in Factor Inequality Weights and its Components: Males
1973 2002 Growth
Rate
(%)
Decomp. 1
(as % of Sˆ)
Decomp. 2
(as % of Sˆ)
Required
Qualif
SQr 11.5% 22.3% 66.1
σ(lnW ) 0.49 0.57 15.4 -23.4 -46.7
br 0.07 0.12 51.9 78.5 156.9
σ(Qr) 2.04 2.11 3.2 4.8 9.7
cor(Qr, lnW ) 0.38 0.50 26.5 40.1
Total 100.0 119.9
Surplus Qualif
SQs 0.3% 2.0% 182.1
σ(lnW ) 0.49 0.57 15.4 -8.5 -16.9
bs 0.03 0.05 59.5 32.6 65.3
σ(Qs) 1.21 1.73 35.9 19.7 39.4
cor(Qs, lnW ) 0.04 0.12 102.2 56.1
Total 100.0 87.8
Deficit Qualif
SQd 2.5% 2.2% -11.4
σ(lnW ) 0.49 0.57 15.4 135.2 270.4
bd -0.046 -0.052 11.2 -98.4 -196.9
σ(Qd) 1.912 1.341 -35.5 310.9 621.7
cor(Qd, lnW ) -0.140 -0.185 28.3 -247.7
Total 99.9 695.3
Education
S∗E 11.6% 21.3% 60.6
σ(lnW ) 0.49 0.57 15.4 -25.5 -50.9
br∗ 0.05 0.08 42.2 69.7 139.3
σ(E) 3.14 3.02 -3.9 -6.4 -12.9
cor(E, lnW ) 0.34 0.50 37.7 62.2
Total 100.0 75.5
Note: factor inequality weight are derived using a standard earnings
equation and an equation with mismatch variables. The equations in-
clude a full set of age dummies but no other controls. The education and
mismatch variables enter as linear terms. Growth rates are calculated
as log differences between the end and starting periods.
in the returns to under-education leads to a fall in inequality. Summing up, both
increases in the absolute value of mismatch premia and in mismatch rates should be
expected to lead to increases in overall inequality. Columns 2 and 3 of tables (3.6–3.7)
provide the regression coefficients for the qualifications variables in 1973 and 2002 for
males and females respectively. Tables (3.1–3.2) contain the mismatch rates. Finally,
table (3.5) presents my estimates for the depth of mismatch and the mismatch pre-
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Table 3.7. Changes in Factor Inequality Weights and its Components: Females
1973 2002 Growth
Rate
(%)
Decomp. 1
(as % of Sˆ)
Decomp. 2
(as % of Sˆ)
Required
Qualif
SQr 19.0% 25.7% 30.5
σ(lnW ) 0.44 0.53 18.7 -61.5 -123.0
br 0.10 0.13 29.0 95.1 190.3
σ(Qr) 1.95 2.06 5.6 18.5 36.9
cor(Qr, lnW ) 0.43 0.50 14.6 47.9
Total 100.0 104.2
Surplus Qualif
SQs 0.5% 2.9% 173.4
σ(lnW ) 0.44 0.53 18.7 -10.8 -21.6
bs 0.04 0.06 40.9 23.6 47.1
σ(Qs) 1.14 1.78 45.3 26.1 52.2
cor(Qs, lnW ) 0.05 0.14 106.1 61.2
Total 100.0 77.7
Deficit Qualif
SQd 1.9% 1.3% -37.9
σ(lnW ) 0.44 0.53 18.7 49.5 99.0
bd -0.05 -0.05 18.7 -49.3 -98.6
σ(Qd) 1.39 1.00 -33.1 87.4 174.9
cor(Qd, lnW ) -0.14 -0.13 -4.7 12.4
Total 100.0 175.2
Education
S∗E 18.2% 25.2% 32.3
σ(lnW ) 0.44 0.53 18.7 -58.1 -116.1
br∗ 0.07 0.09 28.8 89.4 178.7
σ(E) 2.65 2.73 3.2 9.8 19.6
cor(E, lnW ) 0.43 0.52 19.0 58.9
Total 100.0 82.2
Note: factor inequality weight are derived using a standard earnings
equation and an equation with mismatch variables. The equations in-
clude a full set of age dummies but no other controls. The education and
mismatch variables enter as linear terms. Growth rates are calculated
as log differences between the end and starting periods.
mia. The premia almost doubled for overeducated males and females. The growth was
mostly due to increases in the returns to surplus education and not so much related
to over-education depth. Because the prevalence of over-education also increased,
the effect of rising premia on earnings inequality magnified. Under-education depth
remained roughly constant for males and decreased for females. However, the signifi-
cant increase in the penalty associated with deficit schooling led to an increase in the
75
(negative) size of the under-education premia. The latter increase did not propagate,
however, because under-education rates fell markedly during the period.
3.4.2 Differences in Overall Inequality Measures
The relative factor inequality weights estimated in the previous section have the
good property of providing a unique decomposition of the level of earnings inequality
up to a wide range of inequality measures. Unfortunately this property is lost once we
move into the territory of changes in the earnings distribution. Different inequality
indexes will lead to different answers regarding by how much and in what direction
inequality moved. Thus, the decomposition must also be index-specific. The relative
factor inequality weights are still useful in creating such decomposition (Fields, 2003).
Given an inequality index I, the change in inequality can be written:
∆It1,t2 =
J+2∑
j=1
[
Sj,t2 · It2 − Sj,t1 · It1
]
(3.22)
where ∆ is the difference operator. The contribution of factor j to the change in
I is given by:
ΛIj,t1,t2 =
Sj,t2 · It2 − Sj,t1 · It1
∆It1,t2
= Sj,t2 +
∆Sj,t1,t2
∆It1,t2/It1
(3.23)
J+2∑
j=1
ΛIj,t1,t2 = 100%
where the superscript denotes that Λ is specific to inequality index I. I refer to
the Λ coefficients as differential factor inequality weights. The coefficients Λ depend
positively on the magnitude of the change in the relative factor inequality weights
and negatively on the rate of growth of the inequality measure. Note, however, that
it is only the latter element that makes the differential factor inequality weights differ
across inequality measures.
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Tables (3.8–3.9) present, for males and females respectively, estimates for the
differential factor inequality weights for the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of
variation. Here I present results for the specification linear in the qualifications vari-
ables only.30 Both measures of wage inequality behaved similarly during the period,
as we already saw in figures (3.3–3.4). Overall wage inequality increased during the
70s and 80s and decreased slightly during the 90s. However, the rate of growth of
the Gini coefficient was slightly higher than that of the coefficient of variation. The
increase over the whole period was much stronger among males than females. What
factors explain these changes?
The restricted differential weights of education are in the order of 70 percent
for males and 100 percent for females.31 Using what we learnt from the analysis
of changes in factor inequality weights we can say that increases in the returns to
education account for a major part of the increases in inequality. Again, these results
are broadly in line with those found in Fields (2003). However, as discussed in the
previous section the restricted factor inequality weights are probably biased.
According to the estimates that result from the mismatch equation, education
accounts for substantially more growth in earnings inequality than what the restricted
estimates suggest. The differential weights add up to 85 and 93 percent for males and
112 and 135 percent for females. For men, required qualifications accounts for only a
small fraction of the difference between the unrestricted and the restricted estimates.
For women, the required qualifications differential weight is actually smaller than the
restricted education weight. Changes in deficit qualifications and under-education
30The results for the age and qualifications factors in the other two specifications are very similar.
The other controls have a small and negative Λ for changes over the whole period. Detailed tables
are available from the author upon request.
31For these measures of inequality, the explained fraction of the variability in log earnings (R2)
increased at a faster pace than inequality. As a consequence, the residual factors have negative
differential weights and the differential weights of the non-residual factors add up to more than
100%.
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penalties had very small impact on earnings inequality. The differences between the
restricted and unrestricted estimates (and also the most remarkable point about tables
(3.8–3.9)) are due to the very large differential weights of the surplus qualifications
factor. As discussed above, SQs grew at very high rates throughout the period, led
both by the increases in over-education rates and premia. These changes accounted for
10–11 percent of the increases in the inequality measures for males and 26–32 percent
of the increases in the measures for females. For males the growth in these inequality
weights was almost completely concentrated in the 80s. The differential weights
for women are larger in the 80s but also significant in the 70s. Because inequality
according to these measures decreased during the 90s the differential weights for
surplus qualifications are negative during this period.
In our investigation of the levels question we found that, although significant,
the role of deficit and surplus qualifications in explaining earnings inequality was
modest. Also, both factors carried around the same weight for male wage inequal-
ity. Surplus qualifications appeared as a relatively more important factor than deficit
qualifications for females. The results in this section show that questions regarding
changes in inequality lead to very different results. Both for males and for females the
contribution of surplus qualifications toward explaining these changes far outweighs
the contribution of deficit qualifications. The sheer sizes of the figures for ΛQs , spe-
cially for women, suggest that the over-education phenomenon is very important in
understanding the changes in the wage distribution in the last 3 decades.
3.4.3 Differences in Percentile Gaps
Tables (3.10–3.12) further investigate the effects of changes in factor inequality
weights on the distribution of wages. Like the Gini and the CV, the 90–10 percentile
gap is a measure of overall inequality. Thus, it is not surprising that the estimates
in table (3.10) broadly confirm the findings obtained using the former measures.
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However, all the differential factor inequality weights for females are lower for this
measure than for the Gini or the CV. The exception is the differential residual factor,
that now is positive and large. As reviewed above, the inequality measures for females
expanded at lower rates than those of males. The exception is the 90–10 gap, whose
rate of growth was much higher than that of the other measures for females. Moreover,
the 90–10 gap among females is the only measure of overall inequality that increased
during the 90s. While the factor inequality weights of age, and required and surplus
qualifications grew throughout the period, the rate of growth of the 90–10 gap was
more rapid. Therefore, the fraction of the change in inequality they can explain is
lower in this case. Also, despite the fact that the residual factor weight decreased
over the period, the rate of growth in the 90–10 gap for females was so high as to
make the second term on the right of equation (3.23) very small in absolute value.
Tables (3.11–3.12) permit analyzing what happened to the right and left halves of
the wage distributions separately. Both for males and for females the 90–50 percentile
gap grew very rapidly, so the estimates for this measure of inequality somewhat
resemble those obtained for the female 90–10 gap.32 The unrestricted qualifications
variables explain “only” 60 and 56 percent of the increases in inequality in the right-
halves of the male and female wage distributions respectively.
The 50–10 percentile gaps grew slower than the 90–50 gap over the period. How-
ever, the slower growth rates are only consequential for males. In fact, for females
the differential inequality weights for this measure do not differ much from those of
the 90–50 percentile gap. For males, however, the increases in the weights of the
qualifications variables over-explain the growth in this measure of inequality.
32Indeed the 90–50 gaps grew faster than the 90–10 gaps if rates of growth are calculated as
in equation (3.23). These growth rates differ from the difference between the growth rates of the
corresponding percentile wages, which are plotted in figures (3.3–3.4).
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In conclusion, the estimation of differential factor inequality weights to percentile
gaps confirm that the qualifications variables and surplus qualifications in particular
are important in explaining changes in the wage distribution. Nevertheless, some
of these measures seem to grow at either faster or slower rates than the inequality
weights. This discrepancies suggest that factors other than the ones included in the
present analysis could be important in explaining the evolution of these measures.
3.5 Residual Inequality Analysis
The residual variance from the unrestricted equation (3.1) will necessarily be lower
than that of the restricted version. In all studies of within-group inequality, however,
residuals are obtained from an equation of the form:
lnWi,t = Xi,t · γt + δEt Ei,t + µi,t (3.24)
where education is generally entered either as a linear term or as a more or less
restricted set of dummies33. Comparing equations (3.24) and (3.14) and using what
we know about the relationship between the δ and the β parameters, we get the
following expression for the variance of the error term:
σ2µ =
(
βs − βr)2σ2Qs + (βd + βr)2σ2Qd + σ2 (3.25)
Looking at the expressions for σ2Qs,d in equations (3.10–3.11), it is clear that the
difference between the residual variance that results from estimating the restricted
equation (3.24) and the one that results from equation (3.1) will tend to be greater
33In the literature on residual inequality, equation (3.24) also incorporates a full set of interaction
terms between education and age/experience. In this study I choose not to use interaction terms
because the corresponding factor inequality weights are difficult to interpret. In preliminary explo-
rations of the data I found that a full set of interaction terms would not change any of the main
results and added very little to the explanatory power of the regression.
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the higher the mismatch rates. The difference is also positively related to absolute
value of the match premia defined in equations (3.15–3.16).
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Figure (3.5) plots the residual variance for both specifications (solid lines). The
gap between the two series is seen to increase slightly in time. However, the effect
is too mild to counteract the clear upward tendency of within-group inequality. We
learnt from tables (3.3–3.4) that the residual factor—the fraction of overall earnings
that cannot be accounted for by any of the factors—has actually decreased over time.
This point does not come as much of a consolation since it is still true that most of the
inequality in earnings has unknown sources. Decomposing education into required,
surplus and deficit qualifications increases the R2 of the regression but it does not
significantly alter the known facts regarding residual inequality. Thus, we can say that
the increase in residual inequality is not mainly due to the imposition of unjustified
restrictions regarding the pricing of skills in the estimating equation.
3.5.1 Composition Effects
Why has residual inequality increased? Lemieux (2006a) offers the hypothesis
that much of the increase in residual inequality is due to composition effects. The
American labor force has experienced very significant changes in the course of the
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last 3 decades. The baby boom generation is coming near to retirement age so on
average employed workers are more experienced today than they were in the past.
The human capital model predicts that earnings profiles for workers with different
levels of education will diverge as they get more experienced, so there are theoretical
reasons to expect an older labor force to exhibit higher within-group inequality. The
labor force is also more educated today, something apparent in figure (3.1) and tables
(3.1–3.2). Because within-group inequality also increases with education, it is possible
that the compositional changes may be the cause of the increase in residual variance.
Lemieux finds that in 2000–02 a counterfactual residual distribution constructed using
the labor force skill composition of 1973 would have around 11 and 20 percent lower
variances for males and females respectively. Thus, most of the growth in within-
group inequality during the period can be attributed to composition effects. Finally,
Lemieux also reports that, both for men and women, the majority of the composition
effect (around 75%) is due to the changes in education as opposed to changes in
experience.
It is natural to wonder whether these results hold true for the residuals of the
unrestricted equation. Looking at table (3.13), we see that with the exception of high
school dropouts in 2000–02, the residual variances that result from the unrestricted
regression are lower than those of the restricted regression for all groups. Based on
equation (3.25), we expect groups with higher mismatch rates to experience more
significant reductions. This is clearly the case for males. The simple correlation
between the reduction in variance associated with the unrestricted specification and
the total rate of mismatch are 0.94 and 0.72, for 1973–75 and 2000–02 respectively.
For females the corresponding figures are 0.08 and 0.90. If mismatch rates grew
uniformly with education attainment, composition effects would be attenuated for
the unrestricted residuals since changing the participation of each group would have a
milder effect on the weighted average. However, total mismatch rates do not uniformly
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grow with education. Under-education is more prevalent among high-school dropouts,
while over-education tends to hit the opposite side of the skill distribution. It is the
case, nevertheless, that under-education rates fell and over-education rates increased
during the period. The resulting asymmetry between the two types of mismatch
could result in something closer to a monotonous increase in overall mismatch with
education. We could then still expect composition effects to be attenuated for the
unrestricted equation.
Table (3.13) also contains the answer to this question.34 Composition effects are
still important when residuals proceed from equation (3.1). While the attenuation
exists, it is very small in size relative to the changes in skill composition and the gaps
in residual variances among groups. In the restricted specification, overall residual
variance grew around 20 and 31 percent for males and females respectively. If the skill
composition of the workforce had remained as in 1973–75, however, growth in within-
group inequality would have been much lower: only around 9 and 13 percent again
for males and females respectively35. Residual variances grew slightly less rapidly in
the unrestricted specification but the size of the composition effects is practically the
same.36
This conclusion is confirmed if the counterfactuals are estimated using many more
“cells”. The residual variance for equation (3.24) estimated on sample year t can be
written:
σ2ût =
∑
i
ωi,t · û2i,t (3.26)
34Table (3.13) is similar to Lemieux’s (2006a) tables 1A–B but I focus on education alone and do
not disaggregate residual variances by experience groups.
35This statement assumes that had composition remained the same prices would have still changed
in the way they did.
36This conclusion does not change if we used 2000-02 as the based period for counterfactual
calculations.
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where û are the residuals and ω is the sample weight. The counterfactual variance
that would result if characteristics were held constant at the levels of the base year
(in our case 1973) can be obtained by a re-weighing procedure:
∗
σ
2
ût =
∑
i
∗
ωi,t · û2i,t (3.27)
∗
ωi,t =
1− Pi,t
Pi,t
ωi,t (3.28)
where
∗
xt is the counterfactual value of x in year t when characteristics are held
constant at their 1973 level. The counterfactual weight is simply the original weight
multiplied by an adjustment factor. The adjustment is based on the estimated prob-
ability (Pi,t) that individual i is observed in year t and not in the base year. These
probabilities of course depend on the individuals’ characteristics. Here we are in-
terested in the aforementioned changes in the composition of the labor force, so the
relevant characteristics are education and age. To estimate the probabilities we use a
logit model on sample containing only year t and the base year (1973). The outcome
variable is a dummy signalling whether the individual is contained in the sample for
year t. As in Lemieux (2006a), the right-hand-side contains a full set of age dummies
and a restricted set of education dummies (same as above), as well as interaction
terms between the education dummies and a quartic in age. The counterfactual vari-
ance re-weights the residuals so that the sample in year t represents the characteristic
present in the base year. For example, because education attainment increased in
time a highly educated individual in year 2002 will have
∗
σ
2
û2002
< σ2û2002 .
Figure (3.5) also shows the residual variances that result from applying the es-
timated counterfactual weights. It is clear that the reduction in residual variance
associated with keeping characteristics at the 1973 level is much larger than the re-
duction that is obtained by using equation (3.1) instead of equation (3.24). The
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conclusion is that the importance of composition effects in explaining the growth of
residual inequality is robust to the removal of the restrictions that do not allow the
returns to required, surplus and deficit qualifications to differ.
3.6 Conclusions
The “common wisdom” about wage inequality in the U.S. is that it has grown in
time led by increases in the relative demand for high skill workers, probably due to
changes in technology that favor those workers vis-a-vis the less intensively trained.
This paper questions some aspects of the standard story. First, the available evidence
does not seem to support an overall increase in skill requirements. The DOT data
presented here and in other studies suggests that requirements have grown very slowly
during the period that elapsed between the last two editions (1977–1991). Most ac-
counts of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis situate the beginning of the
process in the mid 70s, so the DOT data on skill requirements seems to be in contra-
diction with this story. Second, while more educated workers do relatively better in
the labor market, a substantial fraction of them end up in jobs whose requirements
are below their acquired levels of skill. Over-qualification rates seem to have increased
substantially while under-education seems to be less common. Changes in the depth
of skill mismatch, while significant, have been less impressive.
Surplus qualifications are rewarded in the marketplace to some extent. Thus, over-
educated workers would be worse off if placed on jobs whose requirements matched the
skills they possess. However, they would be better off if this type of mismatch were
eliminated through increases in the skill requirements of their jobs. The converse
is true about under-educated workers. As a consequence, the contribution of the
education factor toward explaining earnings inequality is more complex than what
would appear at first glance.
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This paper shows that skill mismatch is a relevant cause of inequality in real
earnings in the U.S. and that a substantial fraction of the increase in overall and
residual inequality during the period 1973–2002 was due to the increase in mismatch
rates and mismatch premia. Surplus and deficit qualifications taken together account
for 4.3 and 4.6 percent of the variance in earnings, around 15 percent of the total
explained variance in 2002, for males and females respectively. While these figures
might seem modest, the analysis of changes in the wage distribution shows that these
factors are very important. Specifically, around 11 and 32 percent of the increase in
the coefficients of variation of log earnings during the 30 years under analysis can be
attributed to the growth in the explanatory power of surplus qualifications, again for
males and females respectively.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF
CHANGES IN THE MINIMUM WAGE
4.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the minimum wage on wage inequal-
ity, relative employment and the prevalence of mismatch (over-education) in the labor
market.
Influential studies by DiNardo et al. (1995) and Lee (1999) suggest that changes
in the minimum wage and other labor market institutions affect workers of different
skill levels and that these changes may be more important for the observed increase
in inequality than standard supply and demand arguments. This claim, however,
faces important objections: a reduction in the minimum wage may increase wage
inequality, but in a standard setting it should raise the demand for low-skill workers.
Contrary to this prediction, low skill workers appear to have lost ground in terms of
both wages and employment. The college premium has increased markedly since the
early 1980s, but so has the relative employment of high skill-workers. Figures (4.1)
and (4.2) show time series of the college premium and the relative supply of college
workers, and the the federal minimum wage respectively.
The simultaneous increase in the relative wage and employment of high-skill work-
ers has been interpreted as evidence of skill-biased technical change (Levy and Mur-
nane, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002, e.g.). The presence of mismatch, however, implies that
relative wages and employment can move in the same direction, even in the absence
1This chapter was co-authored with Peter Skott.
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of any skill bias (Sattinger, 2006; Skott and Auerbach, 2004; Skott, 2005, 2006), and
induced changes in the prevalence of mismatch may also contribute to an explanation
of within-group or residual inequality, which has grown even more than inequality
between groups (Katz and Autor, 1999). We use the theoretical framework in Skott
(2006) and show that a fall in the minimum wage can generate a deterioration in the
position of low-skill workers, both in terms of wages and employment.
The paper has links to another strand of literature. In a perfectly competitive
labor market, a binding minimum wage increases both the average and the marginal
cost of labor, forcing profit-maximizing firms to reduce employment. Contrary to
this prediction, recent empirical studies point to instances where an increase in the
minimum wage resulted in increased employment of low wage workers, a result that
could be explained by monopsonistic effects (Card and Krueger, 1995; Dube et al.,
2007). The monopsony model, literally interpreted to apply to single buyer markets,
may have little relevance (for example see Stigler, 1946) but as argued by Manning
(2003, 2004), labor markets can be monopsonistic, even if there is a multiplicity of
buyers of labor. Indeed, the survey by Boal and Ransom (1997) describes several
alternative multi-agent models that lead to many of the same conclusions as classic
single-buyer monopsony. We contribute to this literature by showing that efficiency
wages can generate economy-wide monopsony effects as well as skill mismatch: both
the employment of low-skill workers and total employment may increase in response
to a rise of the minimum wage.
To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that high-skill workers can get
two types of jobs (good and bad), whereas low-skill workers have only one type of
employment opportunity (bad).2 Monitoring of workers’ effort is imperfect, contracts
are incomplete, and workers cannot convincingly pre-commit to not shirking. One
2We will refer to good and bad jobs as high-tech and low-tech, respectively.
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solution is for firms to use the threat of dismissal as a way to elicit effort (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985). For this threat to work, both good and bad jobs must
be rationed to ensure that employed workers receive a rent over and above their best
alternative. Good jobs pay more than bad jobs, which in turn must pay more than
unemployment. In equilibrium there will be both un- and under-employment (some
high-skill workers have bad jobs that do not utilize their skills), and inequality between
groups will depend not only on the wage gap between good and bad jobs, but also
on the degree of mismatch.3 As long as some matches of high-skill workers and bad
jobs are sustained in equilibrium, changes in exogenous variables will affect not only
wages and employment rates but also the degree of mismatch. These induced changes
in the degree of underemployment of high-skill workers lie behind the monopsonistic
effects. An increase in the minimum wage may reduce the employment of high-skill
workers in low-tech jobs, and this deterioration of the employment conditions for
high-skill workers relaxes the no-shirking condition in high-tech jobs and stimulates
employment.
Monopsonistic effects have been introduced into efficiency wage models by Reb-
itzer and Taylor (1995) but our mechanism is very different. Rebitzer and Taylor
assume that firms have fixed monitoring resources, so that the probability of detect-
ing a shirking worker is decreasing in the total number of employees. Thus, firms are
forced to increase wages, and with them the potential penalty of dismissal, pari-passu
with employment. In other words, firms face an upward sloping labor (effort) supply
curve, and a binding minimum wage may induce an increase in employment, just as
in the classical monopsony case. Unlike Rebitzer and Taylor, we have two different
types of workers, and this heterogeneity, in combination with the presence of mis-
3Mismatch may persist, also in the long run. If the wage gap between job types is wide enough,
workers will invest in human capital even if there is a non-negligible probability of ending up under-
or un-employed.
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match, implies that monopsonistic features can arise even with exogenously given
probabilities of detection.4 Unemployment, mismatch and monopsonistic effects are
generated by the same efficiency-wage mechanism.5
The significance of the theoretical analysis depends on the degree of mismatch.
While measuring the latter variable has proven challenging, studies suggest that over-
education is widespread in all OECD countries. Estimates range between 10 and
40%, and the evidence also shows large differences in the returns to education to
different workers, depending on whether they are over- or under-qualified for their
jobs (Sicherman, 1991; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000).6 Our own estimates
in this paper produce over-education rates of about 15–25% in the US, and the degree
of over-education changes substantially between 1973 and 2002 (the period for which
we have data). Moreover, we find some support for monopsonistic effects of changes in
the minimum wage: the minimum wage has a positive (but statistically insignificant)
effect on the ratio of high- to low-tech jobs and a negative (but again statistically
insignificant) effect on both unemployment and under-employment (the degree of
mismatch).
Our analysis has implications for the estimation of the elasticity of substitution
between different types of labor inputs. The presence of over-education and of sub-
stantial changes in the extent of mismatch implies that existing empirical studies
are potentially misleading. This paper provides the first estimates of the elasticity
of substitution between high- and low-tech jobs—as opposed to between high- and
4The model can be extended to include fixed monitoring resources, as in Rebitzer and Taylor.
An appendix with this extension is available on request.
5This is unlike the analysis in Manning (2003, pp. 256–262), where efficiency wage elements and
involuntary unemployment are added to models with monopsonistic features.
6Some studies have suggested that individual ability bias explains these results. Slonimczyk
(2008b), however, shows that differences in the returns to surplus and required qualifications persist
when fixed effects are introduced.
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low-skill workers. Our estimates suggest that the degree of substitutability between
inputs may be lower than indicated by Autor et al. (2008).
The paper is in five sections. Section 2 describes the basic efficiency wage model
with endogenously generated mismatch. The effects of changes in a binding minimum
wage are examined in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, and Section
5 concludes.
4.2 An efficiency wage model with endogenous mismatch
There are two types of job and two types of workers. Jobs are either high-tech or
low-tech. Workers can be high-skill or low-skill, and the level of skill is the product
of past decisions to invest in human capital, which are taken as given. Only high-
skill workers can occupy high-tech positions, but both worker types compete for the
low-tech positions.
Firms maximize profits subject to a production function that has only two inputs,
Y = F (NH , NL) (4.1)
where NH and NL are the total number of high- and low-tech jobs that have been
filled (with non-shirking workers). This specification assumes that high- and low-skill
workers are perfect substitutes in low-tech jobs and, to avoid an extra parameter,
that they are equally productive. There are constant returns to scale.
The first order conditions with respect to the employment levels yield:
wH = F1(NH , NL) (4.2)
wL = F2(NH , NL) (4.3)
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where it is important to note that the marginal products (Fi) correspond to jobs. If
Nij denotes the employment of worker type i in jobs of type j (i = H,L; j = H,L)
then NH = NHH and NL = NHL +NLL).
Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), an employed worker of type i in a job of
type j gets a wage wij and instantaneous utility
u =
{
wij − eij if not shirking
wij if shirking
where eij is the worker’s disutility associated with exerting effort. Workers are risk
neutral and discount future outcomes at the rate ρ.
Firms set wages to ensure that workers’ best response is to exert effort. Monitoring
is costly and shirkers are detected (and fired) according to a positive but finite hazard
rate (δ). The rate of job termination for non-shirking workers (p) is also positive and
finite. Discount and termination rates are assumed constant across worker types.
These assumptions define three no-shirking conditions:
ρVHH = wHH − eHH − p(VHH − VHU) (4.4)
= wHH − (p+ δ)(VHH − VHU)
ρVHL = wHL − eHL − p(VHL − VHU) + qHLH(VHH − VHL) (4.5)
= wHL − (p+ δ)(VHL − VHU) + qHLH(VHH − VHL)
ρVLL = wLL − eLL − p(VLL − VLU) (4.6)
= wLL − (p+ δ)(VLL − VLU)
where the Vij are the value functions associated with each of the three employment
states and qijk are transition rates for workers of type i in jobs of type j, and tran-
sitioning into job type k. Equations (4.4) through (4.6) incorporate the assumptions
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that low-skill workers get only low-tech jobs and high-skill workers prefer high-tech
jobs (the transition rates qHHL and qLLH are zero). If the no-shirking conditions are
binding, equations (4.4)–(4.6) imply that
VHH − VHU = eHH
δ
(4.7)
VHL − VHU = eHL
δ
(4.8)
VLL − VLU = eLL
δ
(4.9)
There are no unemployment benefits or home production, and the flow of instan-
taneous utility is zero when unemployed. Thus, the value functions for unemployed
workers are given by:
ρVHU = qHUH(VHH − VHU) + qHUL(VHL − VHU) (4.10)
ρVLU = qLUL(VLL − VLU) (4.11)
Using equations (4.4)–(4.11) and assuming that the transition probabilities for
a high-skill worker into high-tech jobs are the same independently of whether the
worker is unemployed or under-employed (qHUH = qHLH = qHH), we can solve for
wages:
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
+ (4.12)
+(eHH − eHL)δ + ρ+ p+ qHH
δ
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
(4.13)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p+ qLUL
δ
(4.14)
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Given the termination rates for shirkers and non-shirkers and a constant supply
of both types of workers (H,L), all transition probabilities (q) can be determined
through steady state conditions that depend only on employment levels. In a steady
state, the unemployment rates and the rate of mismatch are constant, and entries
and exits from each of the employment states are balanced. Formally:
qHH(H −NH) = pNH (4.15)
qHUL(H −NH −NHL) = pNHL + qHHNHL (4.16)
qLUL(L−NLL) = pNLL (4.17)
Using (4.15)–(4.17), the wage equations (the no-shirking conditions) can be writ-
ten
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
(4.18)
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
(4.19)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
δ
(4.20)
The no-shirking conditions (4.18)–(4.20) define three distinct wage rates. However,
at an interior solution with both high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, we must
have wHL = wLL = wL since otherwise profit maximizing firms would never hire both
types of workers. Trivially, wH = wHH since only high-skill workers have high-tech
jobs.
Equations (4.18)–(4.20) can be combined with the first order conditions (4.2)–(4.3)
to solve for equilibrium values of employment (NH , NHL, NLL) and wages (wH , wL) in
the absence of a binding minimum wage. Using (4.18)–(4.20) it is readily seen that the
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two groups of workers will have the same unemployment rates (uH =
H−NH−NHL
H
=
L−NLL
L
= uL) if eHL = eLL. Empirically, unemployment rates for low-skill workers are
higher than for high-skill workers, and we assume eLL > eHL. The same equations
show that the two unemployment rates must move together. From the wage equations
it follows, finally, that high-tech jobs pay a higher wage than low-tech jobs if eHH >
eHL;
7 we assume this condition is met.
As shown by Skott (2006), this model can generate seemingly paradoxical effects.
Neutral shifts in the production function may affect the relative wage and the relative
employment rate of high-skill workers in the same direction and, moreover, since it
hurts the employment prospects of low-skill workers, an increase in the supply of
high-skill labor can lead to an increase in the skill premium.
4.3 Minimum wages
Now suppose that a minimum wage w is established and that this minimum wage
is binding for low-tech but not for high-tech jobs. We are interested in the effects of
an increase in w on employment and wages.
With constant returns to scale and perfect competition, an equilibrium must be
characterized by zero profits. To satisfy this condition, an increase in one of the
wage rates must be associated with a decline in the other wage.8 By assumption the
minimum wage is binding for low-tech jobs, and an increase in the minimum wage
must therefore reduce the wage in high-tech jobs. Using the first-order conditions
(4.2)–(4.3), the resulting decline in the wage ratio wH/wL generates an increase in the
7A similar result could be obtained with equal levels of effort disutility but different detection
rates of shirkers (δHL > δHH).
8Assume that both wages at the new equilibrium were greater than or equal to wages at the
original equilibrium (with at least one strict inequality). In this case firms would have been able to
make positive profits at the original configuration of wage rates and the initial position could not
have been an equilibrium.
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employment ratio NH/NL. This general result is independent of the wage equations.
Additional results, however, require assumptions about mismatch.
4.3.1 A standard model without mismatch
Without mismatch, the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers reads
wH = eHH
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
(4.21)
and the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers is replaced by the binding minimum
wage
wL = w (4.22)
Using (4.21), a decline in wH implies a fall in NH and since the employment ratio
NH/NL rises, low-skill employment must also fall. These results do not depend on
the efficiency-wage formulation. The same conclusions apply whenever the relevant
”supply” curve for high-skill labor is upward sloping and independent of the minimum
wage (a completely inelastic curve implies that high-skill employment is unaffected
by an increase in the minimum wage while low-skill employment falls).
4.3.2 Minimum wages and induced mismatch
If the minimum wage is binding then, by definition, the no-shirking condition
cannot be binding for both high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. It may be
binding for one or the other, but the minimum wage only has bite if the number of
low-tech jobs could be increased without shirking, even with an unchanged wage. We
consider two polar cases. In the first case, the no-shirking condition is always binding
for low-skill workers; in the second case it is always binding for high-skill workers.
In his study of wage setting behavior, Bewley (1999) found that overqualified job
applicants were common but that many employers were reluctant to hire them. In-
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deed, this “shunning of overqualified job applicants” is highlighted as one of two novel
findings of the study (p.18). Attitudes to overqualified applicants differed somewhat
between primary and secondary sector jobs, where secondary sector jobs are defined
as short-term positions that are often part time. Both sectors received applications
from overqualified workers, but for primary sector jobs 70 percent of firms expressed
a “total unwillingness” to hire them, 10 percent were “partially unwilling” and only
19 percent were “ready to hire” overqualified applicants (pp. 282–83). Two main
reasons account for for the negative attitude to overqualifications: a concern that
applicants would quit again as soon as possible and a concern that applicants would
be unhappy on the job. Secondary sector employers had fewer reservations, but only
a minority (47 percent) “were ready to hire them” with 30 percent being “totally
unwilling” and 23 percent “partially unwilling” (p. 324).
Bewley’s findings support our first case: they suggest that firms may prefer low-
skill workers in low-tech jobs if both high- and low-skill workers are available at the
same wage cost. Bu¨chel (2002), however, suggests that “over-educated workers are
generally more productive than others” and that, because of this, “firms hire over-
educated workers in large numbers.” This claim would seem to support our second
case.
4.3.2.1 Case 1: Mismatch with low-skill workers preferred in low-tech
jobs
When firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, high-skill workers will only
be hired for low-tech jobs if the no-shirking condition is binding for low-skill workers.
Thus, the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers is satisfied as an equality while
the minimum wage exceeds the expression for wHL in (??). Since the no-shirking
condition for high-skill workers in low-tech jobs fails to be satisfied as an equality,
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equation (4.8) no longer holds. Instead—using (4.4), (4.5), (4.10) and wL = w—we
have
VHL − VHU = w − eHL
ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
=
w − eHL
ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
(4.23)
and the no-shirking conditions for high-skill workers in high-tech jobs and low-skill
workers can be written,
wH =
δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
+
+(eHH − δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
)
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
(4.24)
w = wL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
δ
(4.25)
Equation (4.25) implies an important result. It shows that NLL will increase
following a rise in the minimum wage, that is, low-skill workers will benefit both in
terms of wages and employment.
The solution for NH and NHL is not quite as simple. The high-tech wage and
the ratio of high-tech to low-tech jobs are determined, as before, by the first order
conditions (4.2)–(4.3), and the values of NH and NHL can be derived using (4.24) and
the definitional relation
NH =
NH
NL
(NHL +NLL) (4.26)
The effect of a rise in w on NH is ambiguous. There may be a negative effect
on the number of high-skill jobs, not surprisingly, but a positive effect on NH can be
obtained if NLL is elastic and an increase in wL generates a large decrease in NHL.
This possibility is illustrated numerically in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage when
firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs
(L = H = 1, eLL = 1.3, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N0.5H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2)
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N
wHA
w
Θ
1.7 0.03 0.58 0.62 0.29 3.68 0.64 0.9 1.38 0.40
1.8 0.30 0.35 0.67 0.35 3.47 0.37 1.02 1.45 0.32
1.9 0.45 0.23 0.67 0.39 3.29 0.21 1.06 1.46 0.24
2.0 0.54 0.11 0.66 0.42 3.13 0.10 1.08 1.44 0.16
2.1 0.61 0.02 0.63 0.45 2.98 0.02 1.08 1.40 0.06
An increase in NH is a necessary condition for other interesting effects. The
employment ratio NH/NL must rise, but with an increase in NH this condition can
be satisfied, even with an increase in NL. An increase in both NL and NH , moreover,
implies that aggregate employment must also increase. These monopsonistic effects
are made possible because a rise in minimum wages relaxes the no-shirking constraint
for low-skill workers, and as the employment of high-skill workers in low-tech jobs
decreases, there is a derived effect on the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers
in high-tech jobs.
Table 4.1 also shows the effects on the degree of over-education (Ω), the average
wage premium to high-skill workers (wHA
wL
) and within group inequality (Θ).9 The
increase in w reduces over-education and within-group inequality. The average wage
premium first increases but then falls again if the minimum wage is raised beyond a
certain point.
9These variables are defined as follows:
Ω =
NHL
NH +NL
wHA
wL
=
NHL
NH+NHL
wL + NHNH+NHLwH
wL
Θ =
√
NHL
NH +NHL
(
wL − wHA
wHA
)2 +
NH
NH +NHL
(
wH − wHA
wHA
)2
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4.3.2.2 Case 2: Mismatch when firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech
jobs
In this case firms will not hire low-skill workers unless the no-shirking condition
is binding for high-skill workers in low-tech jobs. Empirically, some low-skill workers
are employed. We therefore assume that the condition is binding and that wages
must satisfy the following equations:
wH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
(4.27)
w = wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
(4.28)
From profit maximization we know that an increase in w leads to a decline in wH
and an increase in NH/NL. Equations (4.27)–(4.28) now imply that NH must fall
(substitute (4.28) into (4.27) and use the fact that wH −w decreases) and hence that
NL declines.
These implications are qualitatively the same as in the case without mismatch.
The presence of mismatch, however, adds a few extra results. Using (4.28), it follows
that a rise of w will increase aggregate employment of high-skill workers (NH +NHL).
Hence, the decline in low-skill employment (NLL = NL − NHL) is exacerbated, the
proportion of mismatched high-skill workers (NHL/(NH + NHL) and the degree of
over-education (Ω) go up, and the wage premium, wHA/w will fall. Total employment
(N = NH +NL) must decrease since NH/NL increases and NH falls.
According to this model, the fall in minimum wages since the 1970s should have led
to increases in high-tech wages and the wage premium; the number of high-tech jobs
should also have increased but over-education should have dropped, as should total
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Table 4.2. Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage when
firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech jobs
(L = H = 1, eLL = 0.2, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N0.5H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2)
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N
wHA
w
Θ
1.61 0.86 0.39 1.25 0.52 3.88 0.22 1.77 1.81 0.39
1.64 0.50 0.48 0.99 0.42 3.81 0.34 1.41 1.62 0.41
1.67 0.03 0.62 0.65 0.29 3.74 0.66 0.94 1.40 0.41
employment of high-skill workers and within-group inequality; low skill workers should
have seen an increase in employment. Numerical results are given in Table 4.2.10
4.4 Evidence
4.4.1 Measuring mismatch and match premia
The empirical relevance of the analysis in the previous section depends critically
on the extent of mismatch in the labor market. There is agreement in the literature
regarding the difficulty of measuring skill requirements. The best existing source for
the U.S. is the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The DOT reports expert as-
sessment of more than 12, 000 job titles. We take the General Education Development
(GED) index as our measure of skill requirements. The GED ranks jobs in a scale of
1 to 6 (a GED of 4 roughly represents the skills acquired through high-school). Jobs
with GED greater than 4 are considered high-tech. Unfortunately the very detailed
job classification of the DOT is not available in any representative survey of earnings.
We use the average GED over 3-digit occupations as a proxy measure. The analysis
is thus restricted to the period 1973–2002, during which the 1970 and 1980 census
10With one exception, the benchmark parameters are the same as in Table 4.1. The exception is
the cost of effort for low-skill workers which has been changed to eLL = 0.2 (compared to eLL = 1.3
in Table 4.1). The value of eLL does not affect the solution for low-skill employment, but a lower
value of eLL is chosen to ensure that the no-shirking constraint is satisfied for low-skill workers at
the implied levels of NLL and wL = w.
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occupational classifications were in use. During this period there were two data issues
of the DOT: 1977 and 1991. Other years are obtained through linear extrapolation.
The skill requirements data were merged with the Current Population Survey
(CPS) earnings files. We use the education item to identify low- (high school or less)
and high-skill workers (at least some college). Figure (4.3) shows the distribution of
the labor force across job and skill levels over the period. The graph confirms the
well studied movement toward higher levels of education attainment. The share of
employed workers with at least some college studies went from around 33% in 1973
to over 58% in 2002. Less well known is the steady increase in the share of high skill
workers whose jobs have requirements below their skill level, at least according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics experts. At the beginning of the period only 14.7%
of workers were in this category; toward the end of the period the percentage of
over-educated workers had increased by 10 percentage points.
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001
HH HL LH LL
Note: Source is CPS May−ORG.
Distribution of the Labor Force by Skill and Sector
Figure 4.3. Employment Trends
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Do job types matter for earnings conditional on education attainment? To answer
this question we construct a wage sample from the CPS files. In 1973–78 earnings
questions were asked to the whole CPS sample in May. Starting in 1979 earnings
questions are asked every month to roughly a fourth of the sample (the outgoing
rotation groups). Our earnings variable is real weekly earnings divided by usual
weekly hours, unless a separate and higher hourly rate is also reported. Earnings are
deflated using the CPI (1979 = 100). The wage sample contains all employed wage
and salary workers between 18 and 65 years of age. We weight the CPS data by
hours worked and the appropriate sampling weight. The CPS has undergone several
changes that reduce its consistency over time; details on the necessary adjustments
on earnings and other variables are provided in the appendix.
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Figure 4.4. Earnings Series
Figure 4.4 shows average log wages for workers separated into the same four
groups. The series have not been adjusted for compositional changes within each
of the groups, so one should not rush into conclusions (but see below). Wages of
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high skill workers in high-tech jobs clearly stand out as higher than those of all other
groups. The figure also shows low skill workers in high-tech jobs do better on average
than over-educated workers.
4.4.2 Effects of the minimum wage on wH/wL and NH/NL
Wages and employment are determined by the interaction between wage setting
and firms’ labor demand. The latter is derived from the production function, and we
assume the economy has a CES production function with two factors,
Yt = [αt(atNH,t)
ρ + (1− αt)(btNL,t)ρ]1/ρ
where again NH,t and NL,t refer to jobs and not to worker types. The parameters
at and bt represent high-tech and low-tech labor augmenting technical change. The
constant economy-wide elasticity of substitution is σ = 1
1−ρ . Given the firm’s FOC,
it follows that
wH,t
wL,t
=
αt
1− αt
(
at
bt
)ρ(
NH,t
NL,t
)ρ−1
or
log
wH,t
wL,t
= log
αt
1− αt + ρ log
at
bt
+ (ρ− 1) log NH,t
NL,t
(4.29)
which can be rewritten as
log
wH,t
wL,t
=
1
σ
[
Dt − log NH,t
NL,t
]
(4.30)
where Dt measures technological shifts favoring high-tech jobs in log quantity units.
Substituting a time trend for the unobserved variable D, equation (4.30) can be
written
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log
wH,t
wL,t
=
1
σ
[
a+ b t− log NH,t
NL,t
]
(4.31)
This derivation of (4.31) is similar to that in Katz and Murphy (1992), except for
the modifications arising from our distinction between job characteristics and worker
types.11
Turning now to wage setting, a log linear version of the no-shirking conditions in
the section 3 implies that
log
NH
NL
= log
NH
NLL +NHL
(4.32)
= β0 + β1 log
wH
wL
+ β2 logw + β3 log
H
L
The form of this equation (but not the parameter values) is independent of whether
firms prefer high- or low-skill workers in low-tech jobs.
From (4.31)–(4.32) it follows that
log
wH,t
wL,t
=
a− β0
σ + β1
+
b
σ + β1
t− β2
σ + β1
logw − β3
σ + β1
log
H
L
(4.33)
log
NH
NL
=
σβ0 + β1a
σ + β1
+
bσβ1
σ + β1
t+
β2σ
σ + β1
logw +
β3σ
σ + β1
log
H
L
(4.34)
The adjustment speeds of both employment and wages in response to shocks may
differ between high- and low-tech jobs. To correct for this, we include unemployment
as a control for cyclical conditions (this again is similar to Autor et al. (2008)).
The results are in Tables 4.3–4.4. An increase in the minimum wage leads to
a reduction in the wage premium and a rise in the ratio of high- to low-tech jobs.
11Also see Katz and Autor (1999); Autor et al. (2008).
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The coefficient is highly significant at 1% in the wage equation but only statistically
significant at a 10% level in the job equation. The effects of changes in relative
supplies (the H/L ratio) are also as expected, while the positive trend in both regres-
sions is consistent with skill-biased technical change (and/or power-biased technical
change).12
Table 4.3. Reduced Form Regression for the Hi/Low-tech Log Wage Gap
COEFFICIENT (1) (2)
Time 0.011*** 0.015***
[0.002] [0.002]
log HL -0.267*** -0.400***
[0.087] [0.085]
logw -0.401*** -0.377***
[0.092] [0.079]
uL 0.525***
[0.162]
Constant 0.222** 0.040
[0.093] [0.097]
Observations 30 30
R2 0.914 0.939
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.4.3 Effects of minimum wages on unemployment and mismatch
The qualitative results in section 4.2 are consistent with all the specifications in
section 3, independently of whether there is mismatch and of the precise mismatch
assumptions in the case with a binding minimum wage. The specifications differ,
12The case for skill-biased technological change may be relatively weak (Howell, 1999; Card and
DiNardo, 2002). Skott and Guy (2007) and Guy and Skott (2008) suggest that there is stronger
evidence for ”power-biased” technological change and that, like skill bias, a power bias can increase
both wage and employment inequality.
Power-biased technical change produces shifts in the no-shirking conditions. Allowing for a time
trend in these conditions, that is, letting
β0 = b0 + b1t
would not affect the reduced-form equations. The positive trend in the two equations, however, now
reflect both skill-biased and power-biased technical change.
113
Table 4.4. Reduced Form Regression for the Log Job Composition Ratio
COEFFICIENT (1) (2)
Time 0.025*** 0.019***
[0.005] [0.005]
log HL -0.171 0.027
[0.164] [0.172]
uL -0.783**
[0.328]
logw 0.246 0.211
[0.173] [0.160]
Constant -0.806*** -0.534**
[0.174] [0.197]
Observations 30 30
R2 0.974 0.978
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
however, in their predictions with respect to the effects of the minimum wage on
unemployment and underemployment.
The no-shirking conditions and the definitional relation (26) yield reduced-form
equations of the form13
uL = f(t, w, wH ,
NH
NL
,
H
L
)
uH = g(t, w, wH ,
NH
NL
,
H
L
)
Ω = h(t, w, wH ,
NH
NL
,
H
L
)
13The no-shirking conditions produce three independent equations. Hence, the three equations
for uL, uH and Ω are not independent of the equation for NH/NL. We have
log
NH
NL
= log(1− uH − ΩH + L
H
)− log((1− uL) L
H
+ Ω
H + L
H
)
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where the expression for uL simplifies to uL = f(t, w) in case 1 (firms prefer low-skill
workers in low-tech jobs) and the expression for uH to uH = g(t, w) in case 2 (firms
prefer high-skill workers in low-tech jobs).
Combining these equations with the first-order conditions (4.2)–(4.3), we get the
following log-linearized reduced-form equations
uL = γ0 + γ1t+ γ2 logw + γ3 log
H
L
uH = δ0 + δ1t+ δ2 logw + δ3 log
H
L
Ω = ρ0 + ρ1t+ ρ2 logw + ρ3 log
H
L
In case 1, we expect γ2 < 0, γ3 = 0, δ2 R 0, δ3 R 0, ρ2 < 0, ρ3 > 0;14 in case 2, on the
other hand, we would have γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, δ2 < 0, δ3 = 0, ρ2 > 0, ρ3 = 0.
15
Table 4.5 reports the estimates of these reduced form regressions. The regres-
sions for unemployment include a lagged dependent variable while the regression for
over-education uses unemployment as a control for cyclical fluctuations. All three
equations show a negative effect of the minimum wage, as predicted by case 1. The
effect is statistically insignificant, but certainly there is no evidence that the distri-
butional costs of the decline in minimum wages (tables 3-4) have been compensated
by increased employment. The evidence may be weak but it suggests the opposite:
an increase in the minimum wage may raise employment and reduce inequality. The
strongly significant effect of H/L on the degree of over-education also is consistent
with case 1 (and not with case 2).
14The ambiguity of the sign of δ2 in case 1 was discussed in section 3. The sign of δ3 is ambiguous
for related reasons. An increase in H/L reduces NH/H but raises NHL/H, and the unemployment
rate can go either way. The analytics are messy, but simulations confirm the result.
15These parameter signs follow from equations (27)–(28).
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Table 4.5. Reduced Form Regression for Unemployment/Underemployment
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3)
uL uH Ω
time 0.002 0.002 -0.002*
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
lminwage -0.016 -0.031 -0.010
[0.084] [0.042] [0.028]
HL -0.080 -0.082 0.180***
[0.114] [0.051] [0.030]
L.ulowskill 0.708***
[0.178]
L.uhighskill 0.580***
[0.175]
ulowskill 0.214***
[0.058]
Constant -0.045 -0.046 0.333***
[0.123] [0.053] [0.035]
Observations 29 29 30
R2 0.502 0.512 0.978
Standard errors in brackets***. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.4.4 The elasticity of substitution
Our analysis has implications for the elasticity of substitution. This elasticity has
been estimated using only an equation derived from firms’ first order conditions (that
is, without any attention to wage setting) and without any attention to mismatch
(for example Katz and Murphy (1992)). Using our notation, a single regression is run
with log wHA
wL
as the dependent variable and log NH+NHL
NLL
as the measure of relative
employment.16 We have replicated this procedure with our data set and time period.
The results (which are available on request) are similar to those found in the literature.
The only notable difference between our results and those in Autor et al. is that the
effect of the minimum wage is strong and highly significant in our regression but
weakly significant in theirs.
16More precisely, the dependent variable is the composition-adjusted log wage gap between college
and high-school educated workers and the relative employment measure uses labor quantities in
efficiency units. See appendix B for details.
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From our perspective, there are two problems with these regressions. When there
is mismatch, the theoretically correct specification regresses log
wH,t
wL,t
on log
NH,t
NL,t
, rather
than log wHA
wL
on log NH+NHL
NLL
. Secondly, by disregarding wage setting, the regressions
implicitly assume that relative employment can be taken as exogenous. This exogene-
ity assumption may be reasonable if the labor market is competitive and the supplies
of high- and low-skill labor are highly inelastic. It becomes highly questionable, how-
ever, if wage formation is governed by efficiency wages and the degree of mismatch
is endogenously determined. Thus, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution in
Autor et al. (2008) and other studies that follow the same approach may be biased.
Both of these problems can be addressed through the reduced form estimates in
tables (4.3)–(4.4). The elasticity of substitution can be recovered from these reduced-
form regressions: the implied value of σ can be found as the (negative of the) ra-
tio of the coefficients on logw (or on logH/L). Both of these ratios are very low
(0.211
0.377
= 0.56 and 0.027
0.40
= 0.068, respectively). Note however that these magnitudes
are calculated with substantial error. Using the delta method we can obtain 90%
confidence intervals, which are (−0.05, 1.17) and (−0.57, 0.70) respectively. Trivially,
neither estimate of the elasticity of substitution is statistically different from zero.17
This low elasticity of substitution between labor inputs is consistent with the findings
in (Card et al., 1999).
4.5 Conclusion
The theoretical model in this paper is highly stylized and clearly tells—at best—a
small part of the story behind increasing inequality and the links between inequality
17We also conducted a Wald test of equality of both estimates of the elasticity of substitution.
The null of equality cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance (the test statistic is 0.87
and is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-squared with one degree of freedom).
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and the minimum wage. Several results, however, stand out and may play a role in a
more elaborate account of the observed changes.
We have shown that if firms prefer to fill low-tech jobs with low-skill workers
rather than with over-educated high-skill workers then
• “aggregate monopsonistic elements” arise naturally in a model with mismatch
• these monopsonistic elements imply that a fall in the minimum wage can have
adverse effects on aggregate employment as well as on the degree of mismatch
and thus the degree of underemployment of high-skill workers.
• both within and between group inequality may rise when the minimum wage
falls, and
• low-skill workers suffer a double blow of falling employment as well as falling
wages.
The evidence reported in section 4 suggest that these theoretical results may
be empirically relevant. There is strong evidence of mismatch in the labor market,
and the degree of mismatch has been increasing, especially in the 1970s and 1980s.
Moreover, the monopsonistic implications of the theoretical model are supported by
US data for 1973–2002. Our regressions suggest that the fall in the minimum wage
led to a deterioration of the relative wage and employment of low-skill workers and
an increase in the underemployment of high-skill workers.
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APPENDIX A
CPS DATA
A.1 Overall description of the CPS and the MORG files
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is the major U.S. government household
survey of employment and labor force participation. The CPS is the source of numer-
ous high-profile economic statistics including the unemployment rate. It is conducted
monthly by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The CPS sample is a probability sample selected to be representative of the civil-
ian, non-institutional population of the United States 16 years of age and older.
Because of its very large size—currently about 60, 000 households are interviewed
each month—the CPS allows for fairly fine-grained analysis of labor market trends.
An adult (the reference person) at each household is asked to report on the activities
of all other persons in the household. Thus, there is a record in the file for each adult
person.
Each household entering the CPS is administered 4 monthly interviews, then
ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months before leaving the
sample permanently. In other words, in any given month every interviewed household
has a “month in sample” ranging from 1 to 8 and an “interview month” that jumps
discontinuously after the fourth interview. The survey design is such that each month
an equal number of households belong to each of the eight groups, as defined by the
month in sample variable. This rotation structure assures that 75% of the sample
remains the same from one month to the next and 50% from one year to the same
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month the following year1, which permits controlling for individual fixed effects if
necessary.
Between 1973 and 1978, earnings questions were asked to the whole sample in
May. Starting in 1979, questions regarding usual weekly earnings and usual weekly
hours of work were asked every month but only to households in rotations 4 and 8.
These households constitute the outgoing rotation groups. Each year the BLS gathers
all these interviews into a single Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) file. A
consequence of this construction is that an individual appears only once in any file
year, but may reappear (if found for interview) in the following year. To make the use
of the CPS data easier, the NBER has compiled annual extracts of the files starting
from 1979, making variable names and other aspects of the code uniform across all
files (see Feenberg and Roth, 2007).
A.2 Weights
The CPS has a very complex sample design, whose main purpose is to attain
national and state representativeness and make sure that employment statistics are
highly accurate. The sample is drawn once a decade to meet the reliability criterion
that the coefficient of variation on the national monthly unemployment rate is 1.9%
assuming a 6% unemployment rate2. At the state level (including the District of
Columbia) the coefficient of variation should be at most 8%. To meet these criteria
the CPS sample selection follows a state-based and multi-stage process. Sample
weights are constructed for each individual in order to:
1This is a rough approximation since technically what stays in the sample is the address and
not the people living in it. Thus, the correspondence falls below 50% due to people moving out to
a new location and due to non-response in the second year (See U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 2006).
2The actual requirement is that a difference of 0.2% in the unemployment rate for two consecutive
months be significant at the 90 percent confidence level (for details see U.S. Census Bureau, 2006;
Polivka, 2000, p. 12).
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1. Reflect the sample design.
2. Account for non-participation by some selected households.
3. Chance differences between the sample and known population parameters.
The weighting procedure involves four components. The first component is the base
weight, which is equal to the inverse of the probability of selection. The second com-
ponent is an adjustment to the base weight to account for intentional over- and under-
sampling of certain sections of the population, as well as unintentional sampling rate
differences that arise because size measures used in selecting Primary Sample Units
(PSUs) and blocks within PSUs are not perfectly accurate. At this point the weights
essentially reflect the probability of selection of the household. The third weight
component is a non-interview adjustment, which inflates the weights to account for
the fact that not all households selected agree to participate in the survey. Since
the rate of survey non-response differs by demographic and economic subgroups, the
non-interview adjustment is calculated separately for similar groups of households
from the same sample areas. Note that non-response in this instance is complete
non-response. In contrast, item non-response occurs when a household is interviewed
but respondents only provide partial information. The difference is important be-
cause, whereas complete non-response leads to exclusion of the household from the
sample, item non-response is generally corrected through the allocation of an im-
puted value (see the section on earnings imputation). The fourth and final weight
component is designed both to reflect the fact that survey estimates of the distri-
bution of demographic characteristics can differ by chance from known population
distributions and to account for the fact that the size of the population changes over
the course of a decade. Thus, this last adjustment entails assuring that the survey
estimates of various demographic sub-populations agree with independently obtained
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adjusted census counts. This is accomplished by means of ratio adjustments3. The
overall result of this process is the final weight variable used for most calculations
using CPS data. Since 1979, most CPS files have included separate weights for the
outgoing rotations. These weights were generally referred to as “earning weights”
on files through 1993, and generally called “outgoing rotation weights” on files for
1994 and subsequent years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006, 10-13). In addition to the
already mentioned ratio adjustments, these weights also reflect additional constraints
that force them to sum to the composite estimates of employment, unemployment,
and not-in-labor-force each month. An individual’s outgoing rotation weight will be
approximately four times his or her final weight. This new weight is the one used in
most studies of the U.S. earnings distribution.
A.3 Variables used
The CPS interview is divided into three basic parts:
1. Household and demographic information.
2. Labor force information.
3. Supplemental information in months that include supplements.
The questions in the first section lead to the construction of a household roster,
as well as the gathering of basic information regarding the relatedness among people
living in the household. In addition, the questionnaire asks respondents for other
demographic data for each household member including: birth date, marital status,
level of education, race, ethnicity, nativity, etc.
3There are five ratio adjustments in the CPS estimation process: the first-stage ratio adjustment,
the national coverage adjustment, the state coverage adjustment, the second-stage ratio adjustment,
and the composite ratio adjustment leading to the composite estimator.
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A.3.1 Education Attainment
Educational attainment for each person in the household age 15 or older is ob-
tained. Prior to 1992, the questions on educational attainment asked first about the
highest grade or year of school each person had attended and, then, if they had com-
pleted that grade or year of school. Specifically, the item before 1992 had two parts.
The first part asked, “What is the highest grade or year of regular school. . . has ever
attended?”. This was followed with the question, “Did. . . complete the grade?” The
first question was topcoded at 6 years of college.
Starting in January 1992 the BLS switched from the years of schooling measure
to a credential oriented measure4. The new (single) question is: “What is the highest
level of school. . . has completed or the highest degree. . . has received?” In the new
item, response categories for lower levels of schooling were collapsed into several
summary categories. A new category (“12th grade, No Diploma”) was added. But
the major change in the item occurred in the categories for high school completion and
beyond. Beginning with the response, “High School Graduate–high school diploma or
the equivalent (for example, GED),” the categories identify specific degree completion
levels, rather than years of schooling. Five different levels of degree attainment are
identified: Associate (academic and vocational), Bachelors, Masters, Professional,
and Doctoral degrees. A residual category of “some college but no degree” also is
included.
Research based on the continuous variable “highest grade completed” must be
adapted to the new way to represent educational attainment. There are two basic
ways to “bridge” the old and new questions. First, it is possible to linearize responses
to the new (categorical) question to provide a measure that is comparable to the
4Kominski and Siegel (1993) describe the history of the education question since the 1940 census.
The “years of schooling completed” measure served for 50 years before the change in the 1990s.
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“highest grade completed.” Second, a categorical recoding scheme can be applied to
both questions.
The resulting imputed highest grade completed for the linearization method can
be seen in Table A.1. The method is based on matched data for March 1991 and
1992, where the same individual has answered both the old and the new educational
attainment questions. The imputed value for highest grade completed is the median
(and modal) highest grade completed of those individual answering that category in
1992. A slight adjustment is made for the lower categories (the method is explained
in detail in Jaeger, 1997a,b).
Table A.1: Imputations of Highest Grade Completed for
New Educational Attainment Question
CPS
Code
92-97
CPS
Code
1998-
Description Imputed
Grade
Comp.
92-97
Imputed
Grade
Comp.
1998-
31 31 Less than 1st grade 0 0
32 32 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade 2.5 2.5
33 33 5th or 6th grade 5.5 5.5
34 34 7th or 8th grade 7.5 7.5
35 35 9th grade 9 9
36 36 10th grade 10 10
37 37 11th grade 11 11
38 38 12th grade, no diploma 12 12
39 High School Graduate–high school
diploma, or the equivalent (e.g., GED)
12
39.1 High School Diploma 12
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Table A.1 continued from previous page
CPS
Code
92-97
CPS
Code
1998-
Description Imputed
Grade
Comp.
92-97
Imputed
Grade
Comp.
1998-
39.2.1 GED and Less than 1st grade 0
39.2.2 GED and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th
grade
2.5
39.2.3 GED and 5th or 6th grade 5.5
39.2.4 GED and 7th or 8th grade 7.5
39.2.5 GED and 9th grade 9
39.2.6 GED and 10th grade 10
39.2.7 GED and 11th grade 11
39.2.8 GED and 12th grade, no diploma 12
40 Some college but no degree 13
40.1 Some college: Less than 1 year 12
40.2 Some college: Freshman year com-
pleted
13
40.3 Some college: Sophomore year com-
pleted
14
40.4 Some college: Junior year completed 15
40.5 Some college: Four+ years but no
diploma
16
41 Associate’s degree in college–
occupational/vocational school program
14
42 Associate’s degree in college–academic
program
14
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Table A.1 continued from previous page
CPS
Code
92-97
CPS
Code
1998-
Description Imputed
Grade
Comp.
92-97
Imputed
Grade
Comp.
1998-
41/42.1 Associate degree + Less than 1 year of col-
lege
12
41/42.2 Associate degree + 1st year of college com-
pleted
13
41/42.3 Associate degree + 2nd year of college
completed
14
41/42.4 Associate degree + 3rd of college com-
pleted
15
41/42.5 Associate degree + Four+ years but no
diploma
16
43 43.2 Bachelor’s degree (e.g, B.A., A.B., B.S.) 16 16
43.1.1 Bachelor’s degree + Graduate or Profes-
sional courses (0-5)
17
43.1.2 Bachelor’s degree + Graduate or Profes-
sional courses (6-)
18
44 Master’s degree (e.g., M.A., M.S., M.Eng.,
M.Ed., M.S.W., M.B.A.)
18
44.1 Master’s degree: 1 year program 17
44.2 Master’s degree: 2 years program 18
44.3 Master’s degree: 3 years program 18
45 45 Professional school degree (e.g., M.D.,
D.D.S., D.V.M., L.L.B., J.D.)
18 18
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Table A.1 continued from previous page
CPS
Code
92-97
CPS
Code
1998-
Description Imputed
Grade
Comp.
92-97
Imputed
Grade
Comp.
1998-
46 46 Doctoral degree (e.g., Ph.D., Ed.D.) 18 18
Source: Jaeger (1997a) The post-1998 CPS codes are shown in sum-
mary form (actual codes are split into several variables).
In addition to using a measure of the highest grade completed, it is sometimes
necessary to group individuals by more aggregated educational attainment categories.
The four categories most often used are high school dropouts, high school graduates,
individuals with some college, and college graduates. However, because the old ques-
tion provides no information about whether 12th graders graduated and obtained a
diploma, the recommended category to use is “12th grade” rather than “high school
graduate”(see Jaeger, 1997b, p. 37). Table A.2 presents the categorization that
provides the highest degree of matching between the recoded variables.
In 1998 the BLS began collecting data from an expanded set of educational at-
tainment questions. Contingent on the answer to the base question (“highest grade
received”) eight additional questions were added. Individuals who respond that they
have completed a high school diploma or equivalent are now also asked whether that
diploma is a traditional high school degree or GED. If the latter is the case, an ad-
ditional question asks for the highest grade that was completed prior to earning the
GED. Similarly, individuals who answer they attended college but did not obtain a
degree or that they completed an Associate Degree are now asked how many years
of college they completed. Respondent who completed a Bachelor’s degree are now
asked if they took any graduate or professional school courses after graduating. If
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Table A.2. Categorical Recoding Scheme for Old and New Educational Attainment
Questions
Recoded Category Old Question codes: highest
grade attended
New Question Codes
Not Completed Completed
High school dropout 0-12 1-11 31-37
Twelfth grade . . . 12 38-39
Some College 13-16 13-15 40-42
College Graduate 17-18 16-18 43-46
Source: Jaeger (1997a)
so, they are asked whether they took 6 or more of those courses. Finally, individuals
with a master’s degree are now asked how many years their master’s program takes.
The recommended imputation method (see Jaeger, 2003) can be found in the
last column of Table A.1. For individuals who took the GED, the imputed highest
grade completed is the grade that they finished before receiving their GED, while
traditional high school degree recipients are assumed to have completed 12th grade.
Imputations for individuals who took some college course for credit or either type
of an Associate’s degree go from 12th to 16th grade completion. The highest grade
completed is still topcoded at 18 to keep the series consistent. The NBER MORG
files contain a variable that follows the imputation strategy described.
A.3.2 Employment Status and Type of Worker
Labor force information is obtained after the household and demographic informa-
tion has been collected. One of the primary purposes of the labor force information
is to classify individuals as employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force. Other
information collected includes hours worked, occupation, and industry and related
aspects of the working population. Those in the labor force or who have been in
the labor force within the last 5 years (1989-1993 only, in the labor force or worked
within the last year for 1994 onwards) are classified according to the type of employer.
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The class of worker variable divides the eligible population among private employees
(profit and non-profit), state employees (federal, state, and local), the self-employed
(incorporated and not incorporated), and those that work without pay. Beginning
with the major CPS redesign in January 1994, both actual and usual hours of work
have been collected. Published data on hours of work relate to the actual number of
hours spent “at work” during the reference week5. For example, persons who normally
work 40 hours a week but were off on the Memorial Day holiday would be reported as
working 32 hours, even though they were paid for the holiday. For persons with more
than one job, the published figures correspond to the total number of hours worked
at all jobs during the week. From 1994 on, the redesigned CPS allowed respondents
to indicate their “hours vary”. Typically 6-7% of workers respond their hours vary
without being more specific. However, the vast majority of them indicate whether
they are usually employed part-time or full-time. The NBER excludes these workers
from the MORG extracts, which might lead to systematic bias in estimates if the
distribution of hourly earnings for workers with varying hours differs from that of
workers who report exact hours. A feasible alternative to exclusion involves merging
the NBER files with “raw” CPS files that contain data on hours vary workers and then
imputing hours to those workers using a regression approach. This approach does not
seem to affect the distribution of hours much (see Schmitt, 2003, for details).
A.3.3 Industry and Occupation
For the employed, the industrial and occupational (I&O) information corresponds
to the job held in the reference week. A person with two or more jobs is classified
according to the job at which he or she worked the greatest number of hours. The
unemployed are classified according to their last jobs. The universe for I&O is all
5The reference week is conventionally defined as the 7-day period, Sunday through Saturday,
that includes the 12th of the month (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 2006).
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private workers for pay, as defined by the class of worker variable. The I&O classifi-
cation of CPS data has changed dramatically over the decades. Since 2000 the survey
utilizes the 2000 North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) industry
codes and the census 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). Prior to that,
the CPS had used the 3-digit Industry Classification Code and Occupational Classi-
fication from the 1980 and 1990 census (1983-2002, though there were some changes
in 1992). The earliest classifications used in MORG files are those of the 1970 cen-
sus (1979-1982, also 3 digits). The main changes in these different classifications are
reviewed in a subsection below.
A.3.4 Earnings
As already mentioned, information on what people earn at their main jobs is col-
lected for those who are receiving their fourth and eighth monthly CPS interviews
only6. The BLS processing of the CPS treats earnings of “hourly” and “non-hourly”
workers differently. Until 1994, hourly workers are those paid by the hour. After the
1994 redesign, the MORG files report hourly earnings for any worker “hourly paid”
or otherwise, for whom it was easiest to report earnings by the hour. One difference
between hourly and non-hourly workers involves the top-coding (discussed below).
In addition, a second important inconsistency is that hourly workers’ earnings are
reported as “straight time” pay per hour, which excludes overtime, tips, and commis-
sions (OTC). For all workers, the BLS also reports weekly earnings including OTC.
Thus, there are two earning variables: an hourly earnings variable that excludes OTC
(non-hourly workers have missing values in this variable) and a weekly earnings vari-
able that includes OTC (with non-missing data for the vast majority of employed
workers). Compounding this problem, the 1994 redesign changed the way the earn-
6Yearly income and other questions are asked to the whole sample as part of the March demo-
graphic supplement. A comparison of the different income data sources can be found in Katz and
Autor (1999).
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ings questions are administered. Before 1994, all respondents were asked to report
their usual earnings before taxes and other deductions and to include any overtime
pay, commissions, or tips usually received 7. After the 1994 redesign, respondents may
report earnings in the time period they prefer (hourly, weekly, biweekly, monthly, or
annually). Based on additional information collected during the interview, earnings
reported on a basis other than weekly are converted to a weekly amount in later pro-
cessing. Data are collected for wage and salaried workers (excluding the self-employed
who respond that their businesses were incorporated). Individuals also are asked a
specific question to determine if they receive overtime pay, tips or commissions. If
individuals indicate that they do receive OTC earnings, a lead-in is included in the
earnings amount question reminding respondents to include them (Polivka, 1996).
The most straightforward strategy to correct for this inconsistency is to add OTC
earnings to the straight hourly pay for hourly workers. A feasible way to do this
involves creating an hourly wage estimate using the weekly earnings variable, divided
by “usual weekly hours worked”. These estimates would thus include OTC. In prac-
tice, however, a large share of the resulting estimated hourly wages are lower than
the reported straight time hourly wages. In those cases, the latter data are preferred.
A second strategy, available only after the 1994 redesign, is to use the new ques-
tions that specifically ask about earnings from OTC and to add those amounts to
the straight time hourly wage (Schmitt, 2003). The procedure involves comparing
the hourly wage that results from the straightforward strategy to the one that results
from using the post-1994 data and picking the larger amount. In order to control for
outliers in the form of impossibly high OTC amounts, the straightforward strategy
7The term “usual” was as perceived by the respondent. If the respondent asked for a definition of
usual, however, interviewers were instructed to define the term as more than half the weeks worked
during the previous 4 or 5 months.
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estimate is kept in cases when the post-1994 OTC-inclusive estimate exceeds some
upper-bound (normally 4 times the straightforward strategy wage rate).
A.3.4.1 Topcoding
As already explained, earnings in the MORG files are reported at two intervals:
on an hourly basis for “hourly workers” and on a weekly basis for all other workers.
A problem creating a consistent hourly earnings series is that while hourly workers’
wages are generally topcoded at $99.99 per hour (a threshold rarely crossed), weekly
earnings are topcoded at much lower thresholds. As a result, an important share
of workers’ earnings data is censored and replaced with the value of the topcode.
Even more problematically, the topcode has been changed at discrete intervals (see
table A.3). During periods when the topcode remains constant (1979-88, 89-97, and
98 onwards), the share of topcoded earnings increases monotonically. In order to
provide a method to address distortions in mean earnings caused by topcoding, it
has been usual practice to fit a Pareto distribution to the upper tail of the earnings
data8. The method involves estimating the α parameter of the distribution using the
available earnings data and then obtaining and estimate for mean earnings above the
topcode (for details see: Polivka, 2000; West, 1986). This is the preferred approach
[add estimated mean to table].
A.3.4.2 Non-response, proxy-response, edits and imputations
In cases when earnings data is not provided by a respondent9 the Census Bureau
allocates a value using a “cell hot deck” imputation method. The census creates cells
based on the following seven categories: gender (2 cells), age group (6), race (2),
8A simpler approach involves multiplying the topcode by a constant (ranging from 1.3 to 1.5)
and replacing topcoded data with this “estimated” mean. Schmitt (2003) recommends fitting a
log-normal to the whole distribution of earnings, rather than a Pareto to the tale.
9This case is referred to as item non-response, as opposed to full non-response. Item non-response
generally leads to imputation. Full non-response leads to deletion from the sample.
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Table A.3. CPS Topcode
(Weekly Earnings in nominal dollars)
Year Topcode Share
Topcoded
(%)
1979 999 1.3
1980 999 1.6
1981 999 2.3
1982 999 3.2
1983 999 4.2
1984 999 5.2
1985 999 6.1
1986 999 7.4
1987 999 8.7
1988 999 10.3
1989 1,923 1.1
1990 1,923 1.3
1991 1,923 1.6
1992 1,923 1.8
1993 1,923 2.0
1994 1,923 2.8
1995 1,923 3.1
1996 1,923 3.3
1997 1,923 3.9
1998 2,884 1.5
1999 2,884 1.7
2000 2,884 2.0
2001 2,884 2.2
2002 2,884 2.5
Source: Schmitt (2003, p.33)
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education group (3), occupation (13), hours worked (8), and receipt of tips, commis-
sions, or overtime (2), a matrix of 14, 976 possible combinations10. All cells are kept
“stocked” with a donor, insuring that an exact match is always found. The donor in
each cell is the most recent person surveyed by the census with reported earnings and
all the characteristics. When a new person with those characteristics is surveyed and
reports earnings, the census replaces the previous occupant of the cell. The search
for a donor reaches as far back as necessary within a given survey month and then to
previous months and years. When surveyed individuals do not report earnings, their
earnings are imputed the value of (nominal) earnings reported by the current donor
occupying the cell with exact match characteristics. The “edited” earnings variable
that results contains both respondents and allocated earnings. Allocation flags des-
ignate which individuals have reported earnings and which imputed earnings. In the
period 1979-1988 the proportion of allocated earnings was in the range of 10-17%,
with no clear tendency upward or downward. Beginning in January 1989, earnings
allocation flags included in the MORG files are unreliable (only around 4% of workers
are designated as having imputed earnings). Because the files contain an “unedited”
weekly earnings variable as well, it is possible to device an alternative imputation
flag (designating those with missing unedited earnings and valid edited earnings11).
Based on this method, about 15% of workers had earnings imputed during 1989-92
and almost 17% in 1993. After the 1994 redesign, two new cells (“hours full-time”
and “hours part-time”) were included in the cell hot-deck. As a consequence, there
are no usable earnings allocation flags for January 1994 through August 1995 (the
10The selection categories have not been identical over time.
11An additional reason to ignore the original flag is that some workers designated as allocated
have non-missing unedited and edited weekly earnings whose values are equivalent. See Hirsch and
Schumacher (2004, p.703), for details.
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unedited weekly earnings variable is not provided12). For the period September 1995
through 1998, 22%-24% of individuals had imputed earnings. The series of earn-
ings questions became more complex following the redesign, increasing the rate of
non-response (Polivka, 1996). The rate of non-response kept growing as is today
above 30%. The Census and the BLS include earnings of both respondents and non-
respondents in published tabulations of earnings and other outcomes. Researchers
typically do the same in the belief that biases due to imputation are low and the
efficiency gains of a larger sample are high. However, the hot-deck procedure might
introduce different types of biases. For example, in standard earnings equations or
estimated wage differentials there will be attenuation or “match” bias toward zero
for characteristics that are not imputation match criteria (e.g., union status). The
attenuation is a first order problem, roughly equal to the sample proportion with
imputed earnings, and independent of possible response bias (the earnings of donors
being systematically different from those of recipients within a cell13). Bollinger and
Hirsch (2006) analyze the effect of match bias and, most important, suggest possible
solutions. The recommended approach involves excluding the allocated earnings from
the sample when studying any characteristic that is not an explicit match criteria or
that is only imperfectly matched14.
12According to Schmitt (2003, p.17), the reason flags are not provided is that no earnings were
imputed during the period (the hot-deck was being filled with donors).
13Bollinger and Hirsch (2007) study the issues of response bias and proxy respondents.
14Education, for example, enters the matching criteria at a level more aggregated (educational
groups) than that available.
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A.3.5 Union Membership
Beginning in January 1983, the CPS asked questions regarding union membership
and coverage to the outgoing rotation groups15. The universe for whom union mem-
bership figures can be compiled is all employed civilian wage and salary workers, ages
16 and over. There are two union status questions. The first asks for membership
to a union or an employee association similar to a union. Respondents who answer
negatively to the first question are asked whether they are covered by a union em-
ployee association contract. Normally union coverage is considered a wider category
encompassing both union members and non-members whose working conditions are
regulated by a collective contract negotiated by a union.
A.4 Changes in the I&O Classification Codes
From 1940 to 1990 the basic structure of the industry classification system used
in the censuses of population was generally the same. The census system in each of
these years was based on the structure of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
updated during each decade and used throughout the Federal Government during
that time period. The occupational classification had a similar structure from 1940
to 1960. For 1970 the occupation classification was enlarged by almost 50 percent from
297 categories in 1960 to 441 categories in 1970 because of requests from data users
for more detail. In the 1960 system eight large “not elsewhere classified” (n.e.c.)
categories contained one third of the labor force. The task in preparing the 1970
classification was to search these large “n.e.c” categories for occupational groups that
could be identified separately. The revision for 1980 added another 74 new categories
but deleted 12 allocation (semi-imputed) categories for a net increase of 62. The 1980
15Prior to that, for the period 1973-81, the May supplement of the CPS asked the union question
to the whole sample. There is no union data in the CPS during 1982. For details see Hirsch and
Macpherson (2003).
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occupation classification also was a major departure from earlier censuses because of
the adoptions of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) by federal agencies,
which became the model for the 1980 census classification. The 1990 system had
501 categories, also based on the 1980 SOC. There was not much change, therefore,
between the 1980 and 1990 census occupational classifications (Scopp, 1989, 2003;
Levine et al., 1999).
After 1990, however, the crosswalk tables converting the industry and occupation
data from one of these past censuses to the classification systems of the previous
or subsequent census became increasingly more necessary because for the first time
both the standard industry and occupation classifications underwent major revisions
in the same decade. The 1987 SIC was replaced in 1997 by the North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS), and the 1980 SOC was replaced in 1998 by
a completely revamped SOC. The latter then evolved into a slightly modified update
in 2000. The 1997 NAICS and 2000 SOC, respectively, provided the structure for the
Census 2000 I&O classifications. Here we focus on the changes to the occupational
classification.
In early classification systems too much emphasis was placed on the industry in
which one worked. While it is true that the work setting can influence the job, it
is the hallmark of more recent classification systems that characteristics of the work
performed comes first. The 2000 SOC replaced the 1980 SOC to reflect the dramatic
changes in the US labor force over the previous two decades. Like the 1980 SOC,
the new classification covers all occupations in which work is performed for pay or
profit, including work performed in family-operated enterprizes. Occupations are
classified based on work performed and on required skills, education, training, and
credentials. The committee in charge of the new SOC decided to completely rearrange
the structure of the classification rather than to start with the old SOC and simply
try to make improvements. The world of work was arranged into “job families,” in
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which people who work together are classified together, regardless of their skill level.
For example, physicians, registered nurses, and medical laboratory technicians are all
in the same SOC and census major group in 2000. On the other hand, while first-line
supervisors are found in the same major groups as the workers they supervise, higher
management levels are not. Managers are in their own major group. The following
list shows the 23 major occupational groups of the revised SOC (the 1980 SOC used
22):
1. Management occupations
2. Business and financial operations occupations
3. Computer and mathematical occupations
4. Architecture and engineering occupations
5. Life, physical, and social science occupations
6. Community and social services occupations
7. Legal occupations
8. Education, training, and library occupations
9. Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
10. Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations
11. Healthcare support occupations
12. Protective service occupations
13. Food preparation and serving related occupations
14. Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations
15. Personal care and service occupations
16. Sales and related occupations
17. Office and administrative support occupations
18. Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
19. Construction and extraction occupations
20. Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
21. Production occupations
22. Transportation and material moving occupations
23. Military specific occupations
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These major groups include 98 minor groups, 452 broad occupations, and 822
detailed occupations. Occupations with similar skills or work activities are grouped
at each of the four levels of hierarchy to facilitate comparisons. For example, the
major group, life, physical, and social science occupations, is divided into four minor
groups-life scientists, physical scientists, social scientists and related workers, and life,
physical, and social science technicians. “Life scientists” contains broad occupations,
such as agriculture and food scientists, as well as biological scientists. The broad oc-
cupation, biological scientists, includes detailed occupations such as biochemists and
biophysicists as well as microbiologists. The following example shows the hierarchical
structure of the 1998 SOC:
19-0000 Life, physical, and social science occupations (major group)
19-1000 Life scientists (minor group)
19-1020 Biological scientists (broad occupation)
19-1021 Biochemists and biophysicists (detailed occupation)
19-1022 Microbiologists (detailed occupation)
19-1023 Zoologists and wildlife biologists (detailed occupation)
Broad occupations often include several detailed occupations that are difficult to
distinguish without further information.
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APPENDIX B
DATA PROCESSING FOR CHAPTER 4
B.1 Basic Processing of May/ORG CPS and DOT Data
Data on skill requirements comes from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 4th
Edition (1977) and revised 4th Edition (1991). We use the dataset compiled by Levy
and Murnane (1992) that contains weighted averages of three GED scores (language,
reasoning, and math) by occupation and sex using both the 1970 and 1980 3-digit
occupational classifications. Only the highest GED is binding so we drop the other
two. Scores for years other than 1977/91 are linearly extrapolated. The 1970 and
1980 Census occupational classifications are available in the CPS only during the
period 1973–2002. Thus, we use the May CPS for 1973–78 and the merged outgoing
rotation groups for 1979–2002. The general inclusion criteria are: age in the range
18–65, to have worked in the past, and potential experience between 1 and 40 years
(this inclusion criteria will be referred to as counts sample). Calculations that involve
earnings are done using the standard earnings weight multiplied by usual weekly
hours.
Our wage variable is the log of real hourly earning in 1979 dollars (deflated using
the CPI-U-RS). Hourly earnings are weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours
with the exception of cases in which a separate higher hourly wage is reported. After
1994 individuals are allowed to answer that their hours vary. We use a simple regres-
sion imputation approach to assign hours to those individuals. No allocated earnings
are utilized, however. During the period 1989–93 the allocation flags fail to identify
most imputed earnings. Following Lemieux (2006a), we use the unedited earnings
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variable to identify and drop unflagged allocated earnings. Topcoded earnings are
winsorized using a 1.4 factor.
B.2 Construction of Relative Wage Series
We use the same method as in Autor et al. (2008) to calculate composition-
adjusted relative wage series. Only full-time employed wage and salary workers are
considered. For each year and sex, we regress log hourly wages on schooling dummies
(DO, HS, SC, CO, AD), a quartic in potential experience, a minority (non-white)
indicator, 9 regions, and interaction terms of the experience quartic with the high-
tech dummy and four education dummies (HS, SC, CO+). We divide the sample
into 40 cells: 2 sexes, 5 education levels, 4 experience ranges (1–10, 11–20, 21–30,
31-40). For each cell and year we compute the predicted log wage for whites in the
most frequent region and at the mid-point of the experience range. The composition
adjusted annual series of college and high-school wages results from a fixed-weight
average of these predicted log wages. The fixed weights are equal to the proportion of
hours supplied by the cell over the 30 year period, calculated using a count sample of
all employed for pay workers (inclusive of self-employed). This adjustment should take
care of distortions to measured relative wages that result from differential changes in
the composition of workers at different educational levels.
The procedure to calculate the composition-adjusted hi/low-tech log wage gap is
analogous. We include a hi-tech (GED ≥ 4) indicator among the regressors. We also
add high/low-tech to the criteria for cell formation (80 cells rather than 40).
B.3 Construction of Relative Employment and Relative Sup-
ply Measures
In order to estimate relative employment of College/HS equivalents, we divide
the count sample into 400 cells (same as before but with 40 single-year experience
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categories) and compute total hours supplied per cell per year for all employed workers
in the sample. Broader employment aggregates can be obtained in efficiency units.
Hours supplied by high-school males with 10 years of experience are taken as the unit
of account. The mean relative wage of other cells with respect to high-school males
with 10 years of experience is used as a conversion factor for their hours. College
equivalent hours are hours in efficiency units supplied by college graduates, advanced
degree workers, and half the hours supplied by workers with some college. All other
hours supplied are considered high-school equivalent. The relative employment of
high/low-tech workers is obtained following an analogous procedure. The sample is
divided into 800 cells (2 high/low-tech, 2 sexes, 5 education groups, 40 experience
groups). Efficiency units are computed in terms of low-tech high-school males with
10 years of experience.
The overall supply ratio (H/L) is calculated as the ratio of the simple count of
college to high-school equivalents.
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